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'THESIS ABSTRACT
This paper re-examines the determinants of REIT franchise values, which were defined and
studied in a previous MIT thesis by Jim Young for a representative group of apartment and
office REITs in 1998'. Franchise value was specifically defined as the Premium-to-Net Asset
Vaue (NAV) at which most REITs trade.
In broader terms, franchise value is often defined as the present value which management is
expected to add in terms of net revenue growth to shareholders. A more specific definition of
franchise value was presented in the previous thesis, and a model constructed, in which the
internal and external structural components were quantified, to determine their impact on
franchise value. The same econometric model is applied today to pooled data from '97 and '99,
against the backdrop of a different market environment, to verify which components continue
to play a significant role on a REIT's franchise value over a broader market cycle.
Independent variables are developed as proxies for the components of the franchise value, and
are regressed against alternate specifications of franchise value (the dependent variable). The
dependent variables used in this study are the REITs' Premium-to-Net Asset Vaue (NAV) and
Price to Funds From Operations (FFO) multiple for the sample of office and apartment REITs.
The results show that regional economic concentrations, measures of balance sheet strength,
visibility, management experience and conflict of interest mitigations are statistically significant
factors which contribute to franchise value.
More significantly, this thesis discovered that the relationship between the alternate
specification of the dependent variable, the Price-to-FFO multiple, and the independent
variables is more conclusive than it is for the Premium-to-NAV specification of the dependent
variable. This suggests that perhaps over time, the more objective measure of the Price-to-FFO
multiple produces a better measure of franchise value than does the more commonly used
Premium-to-NAV (which is a more subjective measure of a REIT's portfolio value, and depends
on a multitude of assumptions for which there is little consensus at the present time).
Thesis Supervisor: W. Tod McGrath
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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1.0 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the determinants of REIT franchise
values, which were defined and studied in a previous MIT thesis by Jim Young for a
representative group of apartment and office REITs in 19982. Franchise value was
defined as the Premium-to-Net Asset Vaue (NAV), at which most REITs trade. In
broader terms, franchise value is the additional value, as reflected by its stock
price, that management is expected to add in terms of net revenue growth to
shareholders.
In this paper, franchise value will be measured in two ways. The first is according
to the previous specification of premium/discount to NAV, which is the value of the
company in relation to net asset value of the company's property holdings. Net
asset value is defined as the "liquidation value" assigned to a REIT's real estate
holdings and is an arguably an imprecise figure, because it is based on assumptions
of cap rates, growth rates, discount rates, projected earnings and other economic
forecasts. The second is the Price-to-FFO multiple, which purports to be a relative
measure of the REIT's earning power, based on actual income from properties, joint
ventures and fees. The Price-to-FFO multiple is not tied to the value of any
particular portfolio asset(s) in any way. To the extent that a REIT is a going
concern that can buy, sell and invest in real estate products in the marketplace,
and not a closed-end fund, the Price-to-FFO multiple is deemed to be an alternative
measure of franchise value.
This 2000 thesis will refresh the relevant data as of 4 th quarter 1999 and try to
empirically explain the premium or discount to which REITs trade relative to their
NAV as well as their Price-to-FFO multiples. Several new explanatory variables will
be added to ones used in the previous model as a way of investigating other
aspects of the market that may inform the pricing levels of REITs today.
Data from 1997 and 1999 will be merged, in an effort to "normalize" results from
data gathered from both "bull" and "bear" markets. This thesis will also test the
model with new variables against the 1999 data alone. These studies will seek to
determine whether the model, which was applied successfully when REITs were
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trading at substantial premiums to their NAVs, is as statistically compelling, under
much different market climates, as well as over a longer term.
1.1 Context of REIT Markets, Y2K
The previous thesis on REIT Franchise Value in 1998 was conducted during a
period in which REIT stock values were trading at 20 to 30% premiums to
NAV3. At the time, there were 210 REITs with an equity market capitalization
of $140.5 billion.4 Among the group of 42 Apartment and Office REITs
included in this study 2 years ago, the mean premium was 17.2% to their
Net Asset Values (NAVs). 5 Two years later (as of December 31, 1999), the
equity market capitalization of REITs has diminished to $124.3 billion6, and
the 36 remaining REITs7 in the study were trading at a mean discount of
20% to their NAVs. There has been a recent upturn in the REIT equity
market as of the 2nd quarter of 2000; however there is much speculation as
to its significance and duration. As such, it will not be addressed in this
thesis.
Relative Pricing: REITs versus Real Estate, Bonds and Stocks
Despite the historic trend towards premium valuations, the NAVdiscount as recently widened to its
deepest level in over eight years.
40.0%
Average Premium to NAV 30.2%
20.0% 180%
0.0% 6 -
-20.0% ' 13. 
-40.S0%o
6:8cn' a 6 T o, T ~ 
Figure 1.1 Relative Pricing of REIT returns to NAV
REIT prices started plummeting in the first quarter of '98, an event that was
escalated by the Russian debt crisis and its effects on the credit markets8,
among other variables. Until quite recently, REIT stock values have been
trading at substantial discounts to NAV, and although public real estate
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markets have recovered some ground in the first half of 2000, these have
not reached the same levels nor have they seen the same growth as that
seen between '97 and '98. This scene has been played against the backdrop
of the steady growth in the nation's economy and continued strong
fundamentals in most real estate markets.
Many analysts have attributed this drop in stock valuation to revised growth
expectations for the companies. However, there is also some ad hoc
evidence that entire industry has been affected as a result of macro-
economic issues, such as the Russia's default, the Asian crisis and Brazil's
threatened devaluation and the combined effects of these events on credit
markets.9 In addition, the exponential stock valuation growth of the high-
tech equity markets, as evidenced by the surge in the NASDAQ composite
index over the past year, has also contributed to the malaise in the Real
Estate markets. Nor has the Real Estate industry been singled out-weekly
articles in the Wall Street Journal lament the flow of funds from more
established "old economy" stocks to riskier and less well-known "new
economy" stocks that have seen stock valuations shoot through the
stratosphere.
In addition, there has been an ongoing trend of REIT consolidation since
1995 as companies merge in an effort to expand growth prospects in new
areas and to create synergies through greater economies of scale 0 . Among
the REITs studied, several have consolidated. These are:
* Avalon Communities Trust (AVS) and Bay Apt. Communities (BYA)
consolidated into Avalon Bay (AVB);
* Merry Land Investments Inc. was acquired by Equity Residential Trust
(EQR) in early '99;
* Cornerstone Properties (CPP) was acquired by Equity Office Properties
(EOP) early in 2000 (Cornerstone data is included in this study, as the
acquisition was not yet complete as of 4 th quarter 1999 and the data
was available);
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* Security Capital Pacific Trust (PTR) and Security Capital Atlantic Inc.
(SCA) merged into Archstone Communities Trust (ASN) in '99; and
* Walden Residential Properties Inc. (WDN) was acquired by Olympus in
March '00.
The increasing liquidity of the private Real Estate markets combined with the
inherent inflexibility of the REIT tax structure have also contributed to de-
REITings. Some examples of these within the previous thesis' study pool
include"1:
* Berkshire Realty Company Inc. (BRI)
* Irvine Apt. Communities Inc. (IAC)
Others that have deREITed and have not been included in the study are:
* Starwood Hotels (converted from paired share to C-Corp in Jan '99)
* Sunstone Hotel (SSI)
* Wyndham Hospitality
Today, REIT growth and acquisitions have leveled off-in part as result of
most companies' inability or lack of desire to raise funds in the public
markets, given their discounted valuations, and in part as a result of evolving
expectations by investors. Many analysts note that REIT stock prices did
start lagging behind the general market early in 1998 (allegedly betraying
investor disaffection1 2), however, this was only part of the story. The
Russian crisis' effects on the CMBS and REIT debt markets has largely
curtailed the availability of debt, unsecured or otherwise, and has had an
effect as well on the REIT equity sector's growth from development and
acquisitions. 13
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Figure I
Morgan Stanley REIT Index (RMS) vs. the S&P 500 - Total Returns
Data: 7/95 through 2/00)
.-tg 25. 1995 = 100
Fig. 1.2 MSDW REIT Index vs. the S&P 5000 - Total Returns
Following the global financial panic and ensuing devaluation of REIT stock
prices, public market investors reassessed the desirability of investing further
in these stocks, which may explain why REIT equity shares have not
rebounded in value along with the broader equity markets. In fact,
unsecured REIT debt issuance for the first five months of 2000 totaled about
$1.4 billion, down sharply from approx. $6.3 and $5.9 billion for the same
periods in 1999 and 1998, respectively.14 The implications of this are that
REIT managers have found the proportion of debt in their capital structure
and/or relative cost of debt too high, which is partly due to other corporate
sectors that have borrowed record sums in 1999 and the first half of 2000,
which has further driven up the cost of debt.
As a result, REITs have grown adept at finding alternate financing methods
that increase FFO/share without tapping the public markets. While there
have been issuances to meet ongoing capital needs, REITs by and large have
been using joint ventures, property sales and preferred equity to finance
growth. One example of this would be recent efforts by JDN Realty Corp.,
which, in 1999, sold several of its "non-premium" properties in the context of
a fairly liquid real estate market.15 "What we want to try to get away from
are levering up and (making) new equity issuances," says Charles Talbert,
director of investor relations for JDN. "Both of those, debt and equity, have
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been prohibitively expensive over a year and a half because investors have
cut off REITs from raising equity and issuing additional debt...to become self-
funding is a way to eliminate going to the volatile capital markets."16 The
company's asset-recycling program initially resulted in a drop in stock price,
but analysts thereafter gave the company a positive prognosis as a result of
these efforts.
REITs have also done off-balance sheet financing for development. Typically
a REIT contributes limited equity to a joint partnership venture to facilitate
development. This process is not well-disclosed and difficult to measure, as
some REITs have chosen to reveal these financial transaction in their 10Qs,
while many do not. Also, the amount of debt and its resultant effect on
"consolidated " financial statements are not clearly revealed.
Other strategies include tax deferral through property "swaps", as used by
Summit Properties, which employs 1031 exchanges (swap of properties) or
3 rd party exchanges, which result in tax-deferred capital gains on their
property acquisitions.
1.2 Research Issue
The purpose of this research is: (a) to verify whether the same components
of "franchise value" remain statistically significant in determining REIT equity
valuations over time and against current pricing; and (b) to determine
whether other measures of franchise value, (e.g. FFO Multiple, AFFO Multiple,
Net Income multiple, etc.) have a stronger relationship to the presumed
components of franchise value, and (c) to posit other possible explanations
for new valuations given today's equity market climate. A few new variables
will be introduced to test these theories, within the scope of their
contribution (or detraction) to REIT's franchise value. These additional
variables will focus on components that measure REIT growth, as well as the
REIT management's ability to create value in the current business
environment. Other variables which measure broader market forces (such as
public sentiment, the performance of high-tech equity stocks over fixed
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income stocks, etc.) were discussed and considered for study as well, but
were deemed as being difficult to measure within the context of this thesis,
and do not directly contribute to a REIT's measure of franchise value.
1.3 Changes in Investor Perception of Public Real Estate Values
Some possible explanations for trail-off in REIT stock values may be due to
changes in investors' perceptions of the space markets. As vacancies drop,
investors may think that the markets have entered a development phase (as
opposed to the overbuilt or slow absorption phases). During this phase,
occupancy, rents and prices are unlikely to rise in magnitude as they did in
earlier phases, as new properties begin to come online. Investors are
forward looking and anticipate that the added supply would limit future
income growth, as development typically lags behind vacancy rates.' 7
.% Millions of sq. ft.
140
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FIGURE 1.3 Office employment growth, vacancy rate, and
construction, 1967-1990.
These data are aggregated from 30 metropolitan areas.
Source: Employment, adjusted U.S. government figures courtesy of Regional Financial
Associates, Bala-Cynwyd, PA; vacancy and construction, CB Commercial.
Related to this anticipation is the lingering memory in investor's minds of the
overbuilding in '80s and its long-term effects on the market. Finally, there is
the unknown factor in investors' minds regarding the impending space
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requirements of a new economy, which promises greater mobility and
flexibility in the work arena, and possibly less required office space.
As mentioned earlier, fundamental changes in stock market investor
attitudes have also caused a shift in the equity markets from the real estate
sectors to higher growth stocks. This may in part be influenced by the
evolving structure of ownership of commercial property--from traditional
partnerships between developers and institutional investors, who typically
hold properties long-term--to stock market investors, who expect greater
liquidity and have shorter investment horizons. These investors expect
higher yields and faster growth, as do fund managers, who are judged on
quarterly performances. All this sets the stage for greater volatility of REIT
share prices, compared to direct property prices.18
It is also possible that investors now realize that the real estate industry is
mature industry and not a traditional growth stock. Again, many claim that
investors are flocking to higher expected total returns provided by other
growth stocks in equity sector. Prospects for rapid growth in real estate
values--that is, in the total amount of real estate acquired or built--are much
lower than prospects for growth in other industries. As expected growth is
deemed by many in the industry as the primary driver of the (anemic)
performance of the REIT stocks over the past two years, the new variables
added in this thesis will focus on those components of REIT franchise value
(e.g. capital deployment levels, reduction in vacancy levels, number of recent
equity issuances, management turnover, etc...) which influence growth in
company size, revenues and per-share operating performance.
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2.0 Research Methodology
2.1 1998 Thesis
The previous study defined the components of REIT "Franchise value" as the
"premiums to net asset value at which most REITs currently trade."9 These
premiums were then quantified and empirically examined to statistically
explain the components of such franchise value. Numerous independent
variables were chosen to represent proxies for the components of franchise
value, and were statistically measured to evaluate their impact on the
dependent variables of REIT stock premiums (Stock price/NAV - 1). With a
few additional variables added to existing ones used in the previous model, a
similar format and methodology will be used in this study to try to compare
the results of regressions in a meaningful way across the two years spanning
a peak and trough in REIT share pricing.
Franchise Value Components
Franchise Value, as defined in this thesis, is based on 3 basic categories and
their respective criteria20:
* Internal/External Structural - Business strategy focus, Regional &
Product type, Asset Diversification, Growth opportunities (expanded to
include capital deployment levels and changes in vacancy levels),
Balance sheet strength (expanded to include firms' ability/proclivity to
offer new stock issuances) Visibility, and Low overhead;
* Human Resources - Visionary leadership, Experienced management
(including any changes in management which may signal a shift in
direction in management), Organizational structure (UPREIT yes/no),
Organizational culture; and
* Governance - Conflicts of interest, Incentive based compensation
agreements, Significant insider ownership, Disclosure.
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2.2 Capital Markets Research
Research into the changes in the Capital Markets that ultimately impacted
REITs was conducted during the course of studies for Prof. Tim Riddiough's
Real Estate Capital Markets class at MIT. The evolution of events leading to
the global credit crisis due to Russia's default, management incentives to add
value to each company, the return of private pension fund investors to the
real estate capital markets, as well as methods of calculating the growth and
strength of REITs in an evolving public market were among specific issues
that were discussed and analyzed in the course. Some offshoots of these
studies produced new variables for this thesis:
* Price-to-FFO Multiple - In the previous study, the FFO multiple (stock
price per share/FFO per share) was considered as an alternate
dependent variable, but was discounted for its lack of correlation to
NAV, especially in the office sector. The use of this number as an
alternate specification for dependent variable will be reassessed in this
study.
* Price-to-AFFO Multiple - The Price-to-AFFO multiple will also considered
in this study as an alternate dependent specification. AFFO attempts to
correct the FFO's definitional shortcomings by addressing the omission
of depreciating assets, recurring capital items such as leasing
commissions, and the vagaries of floating rate debt and principal
payments. In general, it has become used more often for its capacity to
indicate future operating cashflows for the company.
* Price-to-Net-Income Multiple - Additionally, the Price-to-Net-Income
multiple is studied as a possible dependent variable to measure
company valuation through earnings growth. Its strengths and
weaknesses will be discussed more comprehensively below.
All data for NAV and independent variables are culled from similar sources as
those used in the prior study. Company disclosures in the form of 10Q and
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10K filings, Proxy statements and internet market links, various real estate
analysts' reports and models, NAREIT and SNL data, were used to populate
the variable database. As much as possible, a single, standardized source
was used for all data involving quantitative valuation of earnings, returns and
pricing.
2.3 Literature Review
Literature pertaining to REIT franchise value and pricing are addressed in
several articles cited below. Other empirical research articles and studies are
cited in the previous thesis.2
Empirical Research
Hartzell, Heckman and Miles, "Diversification Categories in Investment
Real Estate," AREUEA Journal 14, pp. 230-254, 1986 and Hartzell,
Shulman and Wurtzebach, "Refining the Analysis of Regional
Diversification of Income-Producing Real Estate, " Journal of Real Estate
Research 2, pp. 85-89, 1987. These articles propose the categories and
relative benefits of regional and property type diversification within real
estate. The eight product and geographic boundary categories are
incorporated into a variable to determine whether these diversification
measurements are significant to franchise value in this thesis.
Publications from Independent Research Firms
Green Street Advisors, Inc. article on "REIT Pricing-An Update of Our
Pricing Model'", 1/20/00. This updated model breaks pricing into two
major components: the first is NAV derived by marking to market value
of real estate and other balance sheet items; the second is non-empirical
value added or subtracted due to the ability of management working in
current business environment to create value and/or structural or balance
sheet features that may detract from value. While the Green Street
article is critical of NAV as pricing measure by itself, it does validate the
use of NAV as an estimate of firm value, which is forward looking in that it
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incorporates future risks and internal growth prospects. To address its
limitations, the Green St. model subjectively incorporates many of the
qualitative governance and conflicts of interest variables used in this
Regression study.
Green Street Advisors, Inc. article on "The High Cost of Owning Real
Estate", 9/29/99. Although it acknowledges the improvement of FFO and
AFFO figures compared to NAV, this article is nevertheless critical of these
measurements and proposes Adjusted Net Income as a gauge which
"comes closer to the economic truth" about performance measures. It
posits that Net Income appropriately captures the appreciation of real
estate through higher revenues and the costs of realizing this appreciation
through depreciation. A summary of its merits and weaknesses is
presented below: 2 2
* Flaws include: Short (40-year) depreciation schedule does not apply
to most buildings; owners with older properties have artificially low
book value for properties due to this abbreviated schedule; Net
Income straightlines rents and includes gains on sales, as does its
cousin, FFO.
* Strengths include: Recognizes that real estate depreciates. By adding
back all real estate depreciation in the computation of FFO, the REIT
industry is guilty of ignoring this very real, and very material, expense.
The depreciation of the buildings and improvements that shows up in
net income is, conceptually, a very close cousin to the "cap ex"
(capital expenditure) reserves applied by most credible analysts when
they compute AFFO/CAD. Thus, from a theoretical context, Net
Income is a much better performance measure than FFO, because it
better matches revenues and expenses, as well as projects growth in
earnings23.
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3.0 Statistical Components of Franchise Value Examination
3.1 Statistical Sample
Of the 42 REITs included in the prior study, only 36 REITs remain in the
current study "pool" after the de-REITs and acquisitions of the past two
years. 2 REITs have been substituted in this study: Avalon Bay (AVB), the
result of the merger between Avalon Properties and Bay Apartment
Communities; and Archstone (ASN), which forged the merger between
Security Capital Pacific Trust (PTR) and Security Capital Atlantic Inc. (SCA).
Merry Land Investments Inc. (MRY), acquired by Equity Residential (EQR)
and Walden Residential Properties Inc. (WDN), acquired by Olympus in early
2000, have been dropped from the study. Two companies have deREITed:
Berkshire Realty Company Inc. (BRI) and Irvine Apartment Communities Inc.
(IAC). These companies have been removed from the study as well. The
total sampling of 36 is smaller than the original sampling, though it is
considered sufficient to provide statistical data for the office and apartment
sectors. The sampling of original 42 REITs were office and apartment REITs
existing in '98 and are considered representative sample of public REITs in
those sectors. Today there are a total of 48 apartment and office REITs24,
however, for the sake of comparison of data across time, we have not
included those REITs which were not included in the original sampling.
In conducting this study, the identified characteristics of the REITs will be
regressed against the dependent variable specified (NAV premium, Price-to-
FFO multiple, price to AFFO multiple or price to Net Income multiple) as a
group, with statistical findings summarized. The data from the 1997 study
and the 1999 study will be "cross-pooled" into one statistical data set to
verify whether the variables have the same or similar impact on the
alternative specifications for the dependent variables over the two-year cycle
between 12/31/97 and 12/31/99.
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3.2 Dependent variables
Premium-to-NAV as of 12/31/99. Portfolio net asset valuation is imprecise in
that it is based on different assumptions applied by several analysts. To
minimize inherent variances in the individual calculations, a mean NAV,
composed of the average net asset value from 6 different analysts, is used to
calculate the premiums/discounts. Data is for December 31, 1999 out of
research reports from six sources, as shown in Exhibit below 25 .
Exhibit 1
Premium-to-NAV and Price-to-FFO Multiples as of December 31, 1999
Office and Apartment REITS Ticker NAV Price to
Prem FFO Mult
Associated Estates Realty Corporation AEC 74.36% 5.56
Apartment Investment and Management Company AIV 96.82% 10.18
Amli Residential Properties Trust AML 83.22% 8.18
Arden Realty Inc. ARI 74.00% 7.72
Archstone Communities Trust ASN 84.33% 10.66
Avalon Bay AVB 82.86% 10.78
Brandywine Realty Trust BDN 73.57% 7.06
Bedford Property Investors, Inc. BED 73.55% 8.07
BRE Properties, Inc. BRE 81.57% 9.93
Boston Properties, Inc. BXP 84.16% 11.36
Mack-Cali Realty Corporation CLI 73.98% 8.29
Cornerstone Properties, Inc. CPP 73.98% 9.40
Camden Property Trust CPT 80.71% 8.90
CarrAmerica Realty Corporation CRE 81.43% 8.54
Duke-Weeks Realty Corp. DRE 68.53% 9.26
Equity Office Properties Trust EOP 86.12% 10.19
Equity Residential Properties Trust EQR 82.75% 9.93
Essex Property Trust, Inc. ESS 88.58% 10.63
Gables Residential Trust GBP 84.55% 8.84
Great Lakes REIT, Inc. GL 74.26% 3.03
Highwoods Properties, Inc. HIW 68.57% 7.24
Home Properties of New York, Inc. HME 79.23% 10.14
Koger Equity, Inc. KE 68.01% 7.28
Kilroy Realty Corporation KRC 81.18% 9.17
Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc. MAA 78.75% 8.75
Parkway Properties, Inc. PKY 86.41% 8.64
Prentiss Properties Trust Inc. PP 73.58% 7.45
Post Properties, Inc. PPS 86.05% 10.58
Reckson Associates Realty Corporation RA 78.25% 9.30
SL Green Realty Corp. SLG 75.07% 10.28
Summit Properties, Inc. SMT 74.44% 8.30
Spieker Properties, Inc. SPK 83.76% 10.92
Charles E. Smith Residential Realty, Inc. SRW 87.15% 11.17
Cornerstone Realty Income Trust Inc. TCR 75.17% 8.17
Town and Country Trust TCT 107.23% 9.15
United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc. UDR 75.31% 7.58
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2000 est. Price-to-FFO Multiple-This had been considered as an alternate
specification to a dependent variable in the previous thesis, but was
discounted due to its lack of correlation to NAV, particularly in the office
sector. We revisited this variable once more to determine if there is a better
correlation to NAV or if this specification of the dependent variable perhaps
does a better job of explaining the variance in share prices across REITS.
The correlations of Apartment FFO and Office FFO multiples to NAV premium
were 53.3% and at 63.5%, respectively, which were no stronger than the
previous thesis' correlations. However, there appears to be more reliance
(and consensus data relating to FFO per share) on this measurement
available today (see Consensus data for this variable, Exhibit 1, calculations
in Appendix 2); therefore the Price-to-FFO multiple will be tested as an
alternate dependent variable.
2000 est. price to AFFO Multiple-Consideration was given to using price to
AFFO multiple as a dependent variable. AFFO correlations to NAV premium
for apartment and office REITs were 66.2% and 72.4% respectively, higher
than those for FFO. Despite this higher correlation, the disparate sources
and large gaps in AFFO data collected from 1997 and 1999 raised some
question as to the reliability of these correlations and the data in general.
Their lack of standardization in its calculation is problematic as well, thus, it
was discounted as a viable specification of the dependent variable.
1999 Price to Net Income Multiple -- Net Income multiple was briefly
considered as a dependent variable to measure earnings growth, but
discounted due to lack of consensus for its use in industry. In fact, only
Green Street Advisors advocates the use of Adjusted Net Income as a
performance measure.
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3.3 Independent variables
The following Exhibit 2 provides a statistical summary of the objective and
subjective variables which have been used to test the definition of franchise
value.26 The objective components were easier to access, as they consist of
information available to investors and analysts. Some are more challenging
to find, and required consensus data. For instance, in collecting the
Acquisition and Development figures which analysts build into their earnings
(FFO) models to identify company growth prospects, I found a wide range of
estimated data for each company. Some analysts consider the development
figures alone, as they do not believe that there will be much accretive value
to acquisitions over the coming year, given the current high cost of both
capital and properties. Others are bullish on external growth as supported by
acquisition and development figures, but look at other factors such as
management and specific local markets to calculate their NAVs. Most lament
the unclear direction provided them by the companies themselves, and
estimate the acquisition and development figures based on previous activity
and their (the analysts') own sense of how the companies will grow. For this
particular data, I have collected data from the analysts' models directly,
making adjustments for varying accounting practices27 to arrive at a
consensus number for most of the REITs in the study group. In certain
cases, where there was missing data, the mean for the variable was used for
the regression runs.
The more subjective components of franchise value, such as management
variables, required creation of proxy values or other types of measurement.
Exhibit 2 lists and provides descriptive statistics for the Independent variable
database, also seen in Appendix 3. A brief description of the Independent
variables, along with assumptions and expectation for each variable are as
follows:
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Exhibit 2
Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics
Independent Variable Description
Business Strategy
Herfindahl Geographical Concentration
Herfindahl Product Type Index
Change in Occupancy Levels
Regional Growth Opportunities
New England
Mid Atalntic
Old South
Industrial Midwest
Farm Belt
Mineral Extraction
Southern California
Northern California
Balance Sheet Strength
Debt to Total Asset Value
Debt to Market Cap
Percentage Variable Rate Debt
EBITDA to Interest Expense Ratio
2000E Capital Deployment Ratio
2000E Capital Deployment Level
New Stock Issuances (Equity & Debt)
Dividend Payout to '00 FFO Ratio
Visibility
Analyst Coverage (millions)
Number of Institutional Owners (millions)
% of Institutional Owners
Average Weekly Shares Traded (millions)
Average Trading Volume (% of Market Cap)
Total Market Cap (Millions)
Low Overhead
G&A as Percentage of NOI
Experienced Management
Average Earnings Surprise
Average Tenure of Top 6 Executives
Visionary Leadership
Vision Test
Disclosure
Disclosure Level
Conflicts of Interest
O.P. Units Outstanding
Total Inside Ownership
Executive Inside Ownership
Indicator (Dummy) Variables
Focus (1= Office)
Inhouse Property Management
Development Capability
de-REITed (1=yes)
Change in Management ('99 only)
Rated Debt
Evidence of Nepotism
Structure
State of Incorporation
Independent Board Chair
Variable Name
GEOGRAP
INDEX_2
CHGVAC
NEWENG
MIDATL
OLDSOU
INDMID
FARM
MINEXT
SOCAL
NOCAL
DEBT-AV
PERDEBT
VARDEBT
EBITINT
DEPCAP50
A&DLEVL
NEWSTOC
PAYOUT
NOANAL
OWNINSTN
INSTOWN
TRADENO
TRADEVOL
TOTALCAP
GANOI
SURPRISE
AVGYRS
VISION
DISCLOSE
UPVALUEP
OWNIMP
BENTOP6
FOCUS
SLFMGMT
DEVCAP
DEREIT
CHGMGMT
INVGRAD
NEP
STRUCTURE
MDCORP
INDYCHR
All REITS
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
15.3% 100.0% 52.8% 25.2%
50.0% 100.0% 88.5% 17.7%
-11.1% 7.1% -0.4% 2.9%
0.0% 23.3% 2.0% 5.3%
0.0% 100.0% 22.5% 32.8%
0.0% 91.4% 22.4% 29.2%
0.0% 96.0% 10.8% 22.5%
0.0% 8.0% 0.8% 2.0%
0.0% 45.8% 12.2% 15.0%
0.0% 100.0% 14.7% 25.8%
0.0% 72.2% 10.2% 17.1%
29.0% 72.2% 46.8% 9.3%
24.4% 72.3% 4 9 .1% 9.3%
3.2% 74.9% 25.1% 16.2%
167.5% 623.1% 344.6% 86.5%
-41.9% 3090.1% 164.8% 544.8%
-5.3% 12.6% 2.6% 3.7%
0.0% 1900.0% 519.4% 479.8%
28.6% 184.4% 76.1% 24.7%
2 19 9 5
17 264 111 55
15.7% 98.2% 57.2% 20.6%
117 2711 644 534
0.4% 2.3% 1.3% 0.4%
497 12632 2895 2784
1.1% 20.3% 6.2% 3.6%
-0.8% 3.9% 1.2% 1.1%
3 21 10 6
0 6 2 1
2 6 4 1
-2.6% 31.6% 6.0% 6.9%
1.0% 41.5% 12.2% 8.6%
0.1% 26.1% 7.9% 6.6%
All REITs
1= 0= 1=# I 0=#
Office Apt 1= 19 0 = 25
Yes No I = 36 0= 0
Yes No 1= 31 0 = 11
Yes No 1 = 2 0 = 34
Yes No 1= 18 0= 17
Yes No 1= 16 0 = 28
Yes No 1= 29 0= 7
UPREIT Trad/Dwn 1 = 28 0 = 8
Other MD 1= 10 0 = 27
Yes No 1= 17 0= 19
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Internal/External:
Focused Business Strategy
* FOCUS. Office/Apt (1=office)
GEOGRAP. Herfindahl Index of Geographic and Product type
concentration - tests the hypothesis that a focused business strategy,
as defined by geographic concentration, is no longer a significant
determinant of franchise value. The value of this index will vary
between 1.0 for non-geographically diversified REITs to .125 for REITs
which are equally diversified across 8 regions. See Appendix 4 for
summaries of each REIT's holdings by economic region.
INDEX 2. Herfindahl index of product type concentration -- tests the
hypothesis that, unlike regional diversification, product type
diversification is not viewed favorably in the REIT marketplace. The
variable will be equal to 1.0 for REITs with holdings in only one
product type, such as EQR. For REITs which are equally diversified
across six product types, the variable will be .167. REITs with low
index score are expected to have lower franchise values.
Growth Opportunities inherent w/in business strategy
DEVCAP. Development capabilities (1=yes) - It has been believed
that the ability not only to acquire, but to develop property, increases
a REIT's growth prospects and should thus have a positive impact on
franchise value. This may not be as significant today as in the
previous study, as most REITs have not had the access to funding due
to increased costs of capital and/or lack of credit availability.
* SLFMGMT. Inhouse Property Mgmt. (1=yes) - Inhouse property
management capability is a sign of a fully-integrated real estate
company, and is deemed to provide economies of scale in maximizing
internal profit (growth) potential. Indeed most REITs have this
capability today, and therefore, a significant relationship between a
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REIT's Inhouse Property Mgmt capacity and its NAV premium or Price-
to-FFO multiple is not expected to be identified.
Regional Growth Opportunities (See Exhibit 2, Appendix 8 for Regions)
- This is measured by the Hartzell, et al., economic region
segmentation scale as a way of determining whether, for a given
property type, regional focus or growth opportunities are perceived as
adding value to a REIT. A REIT with a high concentration of properties
in certain that are experiencing high economic growth in conjunction
with high barriers-to-entry (such as New England, Northern and
Southern California, the Mid-Atlantic states, etc.), are expected to
have stock pricing premiums, or at least lower discount levels.
DE-REIT. De-REITed? (1=yes) This dummy variable posits that
companies which were in process of de-REITing in '98 were known to
investors and rewarded in terms of premiums to their NAVs, due to
anticipated growth prospects. However, as only two REITs have de-
REITed and these two did so in 1999, well after the '97 data was
collected, this variable was not used.
CHGVAC. Occupancy Change - The increase in occupancy rates-or
decrease in vacancy rates--between '97 and '99 intuitively should be
negatively correlated to expected future income growth, that is, rents
go up along with stock price as vacancies decrease. However, an
argument could be made for this to be positively correlated, that is,
this decrease in vacancy rates (as measured by % change in stock)
would translate to lower stock valuation, if investors anticipate that a
development boom would soon ensue. As investors are forward
looking, it is expected that the latter will hold sway, with lower
vacancy changes correlating to lower stock premium valuation.
Changes in occupancy levels are deemed by some investors as a
leading indicator of potential development. This variable will be
applied to 1999 REITs to see if the negative correlation holds.
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Balance Sheet Strength/Access to Capital
PERDEBT. Debt as a % to Total Market Capitalization - One of the key
components of balance sheet strength, it is expected that companies'
debt levels at or below 40% have additional borrowing capacity and
therefore more growth potential. As debt levels have exceeded 50%
for many REITs in the past two years and borrowing capacity has been
exhausted for all but a handful of companies, this variable is not
expected to have much impact on REIT pricing, except to perhaps
"reward" those with additional capacity for debt (that is, those with
lower debt levels) with higher valuations.
DEPCAP50. Additional Borrowing Capacity to Estimated Capital
Deployment Ratio- This variable measures the company's capacity to
reach a 50% debt level-to-total market capitalization level against its
estimated capital deployment (2000E development and acquisitions).
The resultant ratio is a gauge of the buffer (in years, roughly) that
existing shareholders have before the REIT must "go back to the
(equity markets) well" to carry out its business plan. The data is a
consensus estimate from between Lehman Bros., Morgan Stanley and
Legg Mason analysts. This new study shifts to a 50% debt-to-total
market capitalization threshold, more common in today's marketplace,
despite higher costs of capital. To achieve consistency across both
studies, the 1997 data is adjusted to reflect this higher debt threshold.
This adjustment is not expected to have any measurable effect on the
1997 data, as most of the companies at the time had positive
debt/capital deployment ratios and the measurement would be based
on relative levels of deployment ratios. However, it makes the 1999
data more relevant, given that it is expected that very few REITs today
would fall below the 40% debt levels, which are required to generate
positive Debt/Capital Deployment values. It is then expected that
those companies which have higher positive ratio values will be
rewarded in the marketplace with higher stock valuation.
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ADLVL. 2000 Estimated Capital Deployment-One of the new
variables introduced in this study, this variable is the estimated
volume of a REIT's acquisitions and development for the coming year
(2000E), which are built into analysts' models to project growth of
FFO/earnings for each REIT. These values are taken as a % of total
market capitalization for each company. Though difficult to pinpoint,
this figure is the best measure of a company's external growth, and is
anticipated to be significant in this year's study. A greater capital
deployment capacity is expected to factor into a REIT's franchise value
positively.
NEWSTOC. New Stock Issuance -- Another measurement of
deployment capacity is a firm's proclivity to tap the capital markets via
new stock issuances. Any new stock issuances-common, preferred or
convertible-will be counted. It is assumed that the higher the
number of issuances, the greater the amount of capital available, the
greater the ability of the firm to finance growth. Because there are
some REITs which did not (or could not) issue new equity or debt,
while others have done so regularly, the simple measure of issuance
activity is expected to have a positive effect on a company's ability to
achieve external growth, and thus increase its franchise value.
INVGRAD. Investment Grade Debt rating (1=yes) - This rating
signifies the ability of a company to access unsecured debt, which can
provide additional flexibility for growth opportunities. Having
unsecured debt credit rating should positively impact relative REIT
stock value, which was the hypothesis two years ago. Today, this
ability to access unsecured debt could be viewed negatively, as firms
who have access to and use debt capital, signal slower growth
prospects.
VARDEBT. Variable Rate Debt to Total Debt Ratio - The anticipated
decrease in FFO from fluctuating interest rates is expected to have a
negative impact on stock pricing.
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EBITINT. EBITDA-to-Interest Expense Ratio - The EBITDA-to-Interest
Expense ratio is a coverage level used by analysts to rate a firm's
ability to cover its annual interest expense obligations. A higher
interest coverage ratio is thus expected to decrease the cost of debt
and equity, and should correlate with higher relative REIT stock
pricing.
PAYRATIO. Dividend Payout to Estimated 2000 FFO Ratio - A higher
dividend payout ratio leaves the REIT with less cash on hand for
growth opportunities. A lower payout ratio is expected to have a
positive impact on stock pricing levels.
Visibility
NOANAL. Number of analysts covering stocks - It is expected that
increased investor visibility will have a positive impact on franchise
value and that REITs with more analyst coverage will be priced
accordingly higher.
OWNINSTN and INSTOWN. Number of Institutional Owners and
percentage of Inst. Ownership to outstanding shares -- It is expected
that REITs with a higher number of institutional holders and higher
percentage of Institutional investors should have higher stock values.
TRADENO and TRADVOL. Relative Trading Volume - The average
weekly number of shares traded and % of shares traded relative to
market cap is the ultimate measure of liquidity. If this "liquidity
premium" does exist, then REITs with higher relative trading volumes
should trade at higher levels relative to their NAV.
TOTALCAP. Total Market Capitalization (in billions) -- Following Sam
Zell's mantra that "bigger is better", due to larger REITs' ability to
access capital and achieve economies of scale in property level
negotiation, this variable is a simple test of investor preference for
larger companies. Following the hiccup in the NASDAQ this past
March, and the net effects across the marketplace as a whole, it is
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expected that REITs with the largest capitalization (considered
equivalent to "blue chips") would have higher relative stock values.
Low Overhead
GANOI. G&A as a % of NOI - This variable attempts to measure
investor's perception of operating expense at the corporate level,
relative to net operating income. It is expected that there should be a
positive relationship between low G&A expenses and stock pricing
levels.
Human Resources:
Experienced Management with a Proven Track Record
SURPRISE. Average % earnings surprise -- This variable is the gauge
by which REITs meet investor's performance expectations. It is
expected that REITs with positive average earnings surprises should
trade at higher pricing levels than those which do not meet or exceed
expected earnings. The figure is an average for the prior eight fiscal
quarters.
NEP. Evidence of nepotism (1= no evidence of family relationships in
management). Many REITs were originally formed from private, family
real estate businesses, which sought to capitalize on opportunities
provided by the public market. Though many have had significant
changes in management due to acquisitions and mergers, there is still
evidence of family ties within some companies' management structure.
To measure nepotism's effects on stock pricing, an indicator (dummy)
variable was used based on the evidence (or lack thereof) of family
relationships within a REIT's Board and management at the executive
level. Evidence of such is expected to negatively impact the
company's pricing levels.
CHGMGMT. Change in management since '98 (1=yes) As discussed
previously, the public Real Estate markets have undergone
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evolutionary changes in the past two years. Mergers, acquisitions and
even disappearances of these companies from the public forum have
resulted from these changes, as companies have tried to adapt to the
new (harsher) terrain. This has yielded a turnover in Management for
many REITs, which tried, among many things, to boost stock price
with the fresh infusion of new "blood" into the top ranks of its
company structure. This proxy variable attempts to measure how a
change in the top six Executive ranks within a company in the past two
years, signaling a change in direction of company management, might
indicate higher pricing levels.
Visionary Leadership
VISION. The number of companies which the Chairman or CEO has
taken public - This variable attempts to measure whether a Chairman
or CEO's entrepreneurial skills, personal charisma, or track record--as
indicated by the number of companies he/she has taken public--is
significant in determining REIT pricing levels. Visionary leadership in
the business arena, as defined in this manner, is expected to have a
positive effect on stock pricing levels.
Governance:
Disclosure
DISCLOSE. Press release disclosure test (score based on disclosure
material provided to public) -- This variable is a measure of
transparency, based on a six-point criteria of disclosure level within a
REIT's quarterly reports (10Qs):
- Complete (though unaudited) income statement
- Complete (though unaudited) balance sheet
- A "same store" performance breakdown
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Financial details of each new transaction (excluding simple
summary)
Reconciliation of Net Income to FFO
- Reconciliation of Net Income to FAD
A baseline "score" of 2 is expected, as all REITs are required by the
SEC to submit Income statement and Balance sheet information in
their quarterly reports. Those companies which exceed this basic
information in their 10OQs are expected to be rewarded with higher
stock pricing.
Conflicts of Interest
STRUCT. UPREIT Structure (1=yes) - The UPREIT structure has been
hailed as a useful mechanism for reducing taxable income for the
company sponsors and other contributors/sellers of property to the
REIT. However, the UPREIT structure has also drawn much criticism in
literature for being replete with conflicts of interest-the taxes
triggered by the disposition of properties tied to these Operating
Partnership Units (OPUs) create an incentive for the partners/UPREIT
management to maintain the status quo by holding onto these assets,
thereby missing profitable opportunities for sale of assets. It is
expected that this variable will negatively (though slightly) impact
REIT pricing levels.
MDCORP. Maryland Corporation (1=yes) - Because the state of
Maryland supports strict anti-corporate takeover provisions, it is
expected that REITs which seek this protection are those which intend
to protect their operating partnership units from unfavorable tax
consequences, and may thus sacrifice shareholder interests in the
event of value-enhancing purchase offers from outside entities.
INDYCHR. Separation of Mgmt and Board Leadership (1=Inside Chair)
- This variable tests governance strength by revealing whether there
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is separation between Board and management in the company, as
evidenced by the existence of separate CEO and Chairman within a
company's Board of Directors. It is expected that this separation will
have a positive impact on REIT pricing.
OWNIMP. Percentage Insider Ownership, including stock options - The
alignment of interest is often reflected in the compensation of
"Insiders", or those within the Executive management or Board. This
variable measures the percentage of ownership as a proxy for
protection against conflicts of interest. Data is from SNL Securities
and represents the last reported 1999 data.
BENTOP6. Percentage Insider Ownership of the top 6 officers of the
REIT - This variable is a second test of alignment of management and
shareholder interest. The percentage of beneficial stock ownership,
including operating partnership units, if applicable, of the top six
executive positions is derived from 1999 Proxy Statements. It is
expected that inside ownership is positively correlated to higher pricing
levels.
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4.0 Regression results
As stated earlier, the prior data set was expanded to determine whether the
statistical model would be representative of stock valuation during "normal" cycles.
In this way it is hoped that the regressions can sift out those significant elements of
franchise value as described in this thesis, adjusting for any extraordinary market
context influences. A Summary of Regressions results is presented in Exhibit 3.
Exhibit 3
Summary of Adjusted R-Squared Values
NAV Premium - Dependent FFO Multiple- Dependent
Variables Variable
'99 Data Only '97-'99 Data '99 Data Only '97-'99 Data
Orig. (Control) n/a 64.7% n/a 76.6%
Independent
Variables
Orig. + New 36.3% 60.9% 60.2% 76.6%
Independent
Variables
The regression analyses of the variables described in Chapter 3 resulted in a
statistical model which explains 64.7% of the variance in the Premium-to-net asset
values and 76.6% of the variance in Price-to-FFO multiples, the alternate
specification of dependent variable in the study (see Appendices 5a and 7a). These
results are echoed in results of regressions using the original plus the new variables
against both the NAV premium and Price-to-FFO multiple, with R-squared "scores"
of 60.9% and 76.6%, respectively (See Appendices 5b and 7b). It is by sheer
coincidence that the same Adjusted R-squared values of 76.6% resulted from both
regressions on the original (control) variables as well as the original + "new"
variables. One explanation would be that the runs are nearly identical, with
virtually the same variables removed due to collinearity problems associated with
these variables. In addition, only two out of the four new variables introduced were
applied to these runs, due to incomplete data for 1997. Of the two, NEWSTOC
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proved to be insignificant. The other variable, ADLVL, which measures deployment
capacity, replaced DEPCAP50, which was removed due to multi-collinearity
problems. All four new variables were applied to regressions on the 1999 data set,
producing much more varied results (see discussion below).
From the results given above, it appears that the strength of the relationship of the
independent variables to the franchise value as measured by Premium-to-NAV is
not constant over time. The previous thesis yielded an Adjusted R-squared value of
72.9%28, versus 64.7% today. However, the results from the regressions suggests
a much stronger relationship between the variables and the Price-to-FFO multiple
as an alternate dependent variable, at a much higher Adj. R-squared value of
76.6% and lower Standard of Error of 1.228%. These results are replicated in the
results of the regression using the "original + new" variables against the NAV
premium or discount (Adj. R-squared of 60.9%) and the alternate dependent
specification of the FFO multiple (again, an Adj. R-squared of 76.6%). The results
of the regressions for the '97-'99 merged data using the Premium-to-NAV as a
dependent variable is shown in Appendices 5a and 5b.
The results using the same model on the 1999 data were much weaker (36.3%
adjusted R-squared using NAV premium as a dependent variable, and 60.2%
adjusted R-squared using the FFO multiple as a dependent variable). While these
results suggest that the model perhaps does not present the correct hypotheses on
data collected during a bear market, it is interesting to note that the stronger
relationship shown between the variables and the FFO multiple is evident on this
study as well. The results of the regressions on the 1999 data set only are shown
in Appendices 6A and 6B.
For the remainder of this thesis, I will focus on the results of the regressions on the
expanded '97-'99 data set, using the original, "control" independent variables and
the Price-to-FFO multiple as the dependent variable. The slight differences between
this run and that including the new variables will be noted in the text and detailed
in the FFO Regression Summary presented in Exhibit 4 and documented in
Appendices 7A and 7B. A discussion of each of the statistically significant variables
and of selected non-statistically significant variables from the model follows.
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Exhibit 4
Summary of '97-'99 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Price-to-FFO Multiple
Independent Variables: Original (Control)
Variable Dexcription Variable Included Variables Excluded Variables
Name Coefficient t-stat Significance Coefficient t-stat Significance
Constant 13.939 23.210 0.000
Focus
Focus (1= Office) FOCUS -1.586 -0.360 0.000
Business Strategy
Herfindahl Geographical Concentration GEOGRAP 0.053 0.827 0.411
Herfindahl Product Type Index INDEX_2 -0.054 0.643 0.522
Development Capability DEVCAP 0.011 0.173 0.863
Regional Growth Opportunities
Mid Atlantic MIDATL 0.024 5.145 0.000
Old South OLDSOU -0.027 -0.350 0.728
Industrial Midwest INDMID 0.029 0.446 0.657
Farm Belt FARM 0.117 2.044 0.045
Mineral Extraction MINEXT -0.007 0.106 0.916
Southern California SOCAL 0.016 3.081 0.003
Northern California NOCAL -0.009 -0.144 0.886
Balance Sheet Strength
Debt to Market Cap PERDEBT -0.146 -12.106 0.000
Percentage Variable Rate Debt VARDEBT 0.012 0.181 0.857
Rated Debt INVGRAD 0.072 0.932 0.355
2000E Capital Deployment Ratio DEPCAP50 -0.064 -1.068 0.29
2000E Capital Deployment Level* A&DLEVL 0.078 1.029 0.307
Dividend Payout to '00 FFO Ratio PAYRATIO -0.005 -0.080 0.936
Visibility
% of Institutional Owners INSTOWN -0.032 -0.483 0.631
Average Trading Volume (% of Market Cap) TRADEVOL 0.097 1.453 0.151
Total Market Cap (Billions) TOTALCAP 0.005 6.957 0.000
Low Overhead
G&A as Percentage of NOI GANOI 0.137 3.555 0.001
Experienced Management
Average Earnings Surprise SURPRISE 0.371 3.521 0.001
Average Tenure of Top 6 Executives AVGYRS 0.072 3.135 0.003
Visionary Leadership
Vision Test VISION -0.665 -5.035 0.000
Disclosure
Disclosure Level DISCLOSE -0.214 -2.791 0.007
Conflicts of Interest
Executive Inside Ownership BENTOP6 -0.041 1.951 0.055
Evidence of Nepotism NEP 0.046 0.588 0.559
Structure STRUCT 0.003 0.043 0.966
% Inside Board PERINSID 0.065 1.016 0.313
State of Incorporation MDCORP -0.051 -0.731 0.467
Independent Board Chair INDYCHR -0.018 -0.288 0.775
Adjusted R-squared = 76.6%
Removed Variables: FOCUS, SLFMGMT, NEWENG, DEBTTAV, EBITINT, NOANAL, OWNINSTN, TRADENO, UPVALUEP, OWNIMP
* A&Dlevel replaces DEPCAP50 in Regressions using Orig. (Control) + New Variables
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4.1 1997-1999 Regressions Against Price-to-FFO Multiple - Review of
Statistically Significant Variables
Focused Business Strategy
FOCUS. Focus (1=Office) - The negative coefficient associated with
this dummy variable indicates that a specific office focus detracts from
a REIT's franchise value. This could indicate that apartment REITs
have had a greater price appreciation over the two-year period than
have office REITs. This would make sense, given the greater stability
of commercial housing over a longer time period, and--though perhaps
unjustifiably, given the strength of real estate fundamentals in all
sectors of late-investors' lingering memories of the last cycle's
treatment of office property valuation.
Growth Opportunities Inherent in Business Strategy
Three regions emerged from the group of variables designed to reflect
economic opportunities by regional portfolio concentration as having a
statistically significant impact on REIT franchise value. All show a positive
impact, although of the three, the Mid-Atlantic region, which captures a wide
region encompassing New York, New Jersey and the large MSAs covering
Fairfield County in Connecticut, Philadelphia and its suburbs, and the
Metropolitan Washington area, shows the strongest significance based on its
high t-stat value (see also Exhibit 4, Summary of Regression Results).
MIDATL. Mid-Atlantic - The strong positive coefficient reflects the
dynamic real estate markets in this area during the past two years.
This strength is primarily based on the growth of the high tech market
(Silicon Alley in NYC and the Dulles Corridor in Washington's suburbs)
in particular, and the strength of the financial services sectors
throughout the Mid-Atlantic corridor in general. The growth and
expansion possibilities in this region eclipse that of the New England
region, which had fairly high significance in the previous thesis.
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FARM. Farm - The positive, though not very strong coefficient
associated with this region, which covers the vast mid-portion of this
country2 9, including the Great Plains (see Appendix 8), is surprising.
This may indicate the growth expected in back office space markets in
the Midwest. However, it should also be noted that the collinearity
diagnostics in the statistical program indicated a mild problem with
this variable, which may skew the data and imply its significance is
greater than it should be.
SOCAL. Southern California - The positive coefficient associated with
this vast region, which covers MSAs ranging from Los Angeles to San
Diego and stretches to Las Vegas in Nevada, reflects the ongoing
growth potential of this part of the country, in particular the industrial
areas east of Los Angeles and those areas benefiting from the spillover
effects of the gambling industry in Nevada.
Balance Sheet Strength/Access to Capital
PERDEBT. Percentage Debt to Total Market Capitalization - One of the
key components of balance sheet strength, it emerged consistently as
the most significant variable in all of the regressions done in this
thesis. It appears that investors' concerns about default risks
associated with high leverage outweigh any growth potential
associated with higher debt levels, rendering this variable as a strong
negative component of franchise value. It is interesting to note that in
the previous thesis, Percentage Variable Rate Debt (VARDEBT) came in
as a negative component of franchise value, and that Percentage Debt
was removed due to collinearity issues. It should also be noted that
the 1999 debt ratios greatly amplify the overall data due to higher
debt levels and lower relative market capitalization as a whole as of
December 1999. This may have the effect of skewing the level of
significance of this variable in the combined study. A more
comprehensive study would be required to see whether this variable's
impact is sustainable over a longer time period.
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Visibility
TOTALCAP. Total Market Capitalization (in billions) -- This variable,
which emerged with a solid positive coefficient, is a simple test of
investor preference for larger companies. Following the volatility seen
in all sectors of the equity markets, it is expected that REITs with the
largest capitalization would have higher relative stock values as
investors flock to "safer" havens. This is borne out by this study, as
companies with greater market capitalization and visibility are
rewarded with a relative higher price multiple.
Low Overhead
GANOI. G&A as a % of NOI - This variable is a measure of investors'
perception of corporate efficiency (low overhead). It is expected that
there should be an inverse relationship between G&A expenses and
stock pricing levels. However, this study shows the opposite
occurring, where higher G&A to NOI ratios are positively correlated
with stock price levels. Perhaps an interpretation for this is that other
variables override the effects of this corporate measurement of
company efficiency. John Fosheim, of Green Street Advisers, notes
that "the overall decrease of EQR and EOP's (G&A/NOI) ratio due to
their recent unprecedented growth through acquisitions has not seen a
corresponding rise in the companies' stock valuations." He suggests
that this disconnect may have less to do with the companies' ability to
control their corporate overhead levels, and more to do with
overarching concerns investors might have regarding the companies'
abilities to manage and leverage their acquisitions into greater internal
growth ex ante.
Experienced Management
* AVGYRS. Average Number of Years - The average number of years of
experience of the top 6 company executives has a positive coefficient,
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indicating that experienced leadership is indeed valued, albeit
subjectively, in determining REIT franchise value. This is particularly
so in the down cycles, when company growth and performance is
reliant on the direction that experienced management provides until
frothier times return.
SURPRISE. Average Earnings Surprise - This variable is the gauge by
which REITs meet investor's performance expectations. It is
reinforced in this variable's high t-statistic and positive coefficient that
REITs with positive average earnings surprises trade at higher pricing
levels than those which do not meet or exceed expected earnings.
VISION. Vision - This variable is a count of the number of companies
that a REIT's chairman has taken public, and was expected to have a
positive impact on franchise value. Its significant negative coefficient
indicates that the results may be tied to the investors' impression that
an entrepreneurial leader who is more prone to incubate new
enterprises may not have the staying power required to take a
company through stages of maturity and more challenging market
climates.
Disclosure
DISCLOSE. Disclosure - The negative coefficient and significant level
of this variable was surprising, given its relatively small significance in
the previous thesis and its expected positive impact on REIT valuation.
The press release disclosure test (scores based on 6 levels of
disclosure material provided to public) is expected to manifest itself as
a significant variable, particularly in the down-cycle, when more
information is required by investors to enable them to assess a
company's growth prospects. Regrettably, the negative correlation
suggests that more transparency generates greater caution (or
skepticism) on the part of investors, and results in lower stock
valuation relative to the companies' NAV.
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Conflicts of Interest
BENTOP6. Executive Inside Ownership - The percentage insider
ownership of the top 6 Officials was a second test of alignment of
management and shareholder interest. The ownership of the company
by the executive management, who are in a greater position to direct
that company's growth and earnings, weighs in as a positive, yet
significant, variable in the regressions.
4.2 1997-1999 Regressions Against Price-to-FFO Multiple - Review of non-
Statistically Significant Variables
Several of the Independent Variables in the model failed to surface as
statistically significant in this sample of REITs, but had higher t-statistics (a
minimum of 70% or greater confidence level) than other "excluded" variables
and are considered moderately significant (see Appendix 7B). They are as
follows:
Growth in Business Strategy
DEPCAP50. Debt Capacity to Acquisitions and Development Ratio -
The sign on this variable, which measures the ratio of Debt Capacity
(up to 50% levels as of 12/31/99) over estimated Acquisitions and
Development (for 2000), is negative, and not as expected. This
variable was expected to have greater significance and a positive
correlation to stock level valuation; however, due to what we believe
as inconsistent data, has a negative coefficient.
ADLVL. Acquisition and Development Level - The percentage of
Acquisitions and Development to total market capitalization for each
company is measure of estimated Capital Deployment for 2000, and is
one of the new variables introduced this year. This variable was
expected to be both positive and significant in the regressions that
included the new variables. The sign of the coefficient for this variable
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was as expected (see Exhibit 4 and Appendix 7B), though not
significant, perhaps due again to inconsistent data provided by
analysts, whose projections for this variable had a large standard
deviation to the mean, as seen in the Consensus Table (Appendix 9).
This was perhaps the most difficult estimate to gather and the most
difficult for which to collect consensus data. Part of the accuracy of
this Acquisitions and Development projection may be impacted by the
importance placed on this number by the various investment houses.
For example, there are those such as Lehman Bros. analyst David
Harris, who feel that there "will be NO growth (in per-share financial
performance) attributable to acquisitions, due to the high cost of
capital compared to relative returns on real estate investments."
Additionally, Lehman Brothers builds in a 10% contingency to costs
attributable to development, to factor in uncertainties in development
expenses, admitting that in certain markets, that figure might be
larger, such as in New York, and vice versa in other markets, such as
Phoenix. Then there are Legg Mason analysts who take the middle of
the road and have projected that 75% of REITs' growth will be
attributable to internal growth, 25% to external (A&D activity) growth.
John Fosheim of Green Street Advisors, asserts that learned investors
will pay a premium to invest in what appears to be high
acquisition/development activity, depending on WHERE the
marketplace is and WHO is managing these companies--within a
certain time period. However, he concedes that "internal growth is
still easier to measure and forecast than external growth." This results
in a great disparity between the A&D numbers and resultant
inconsistent data. When there is better information from the
companies themselves, and a greater consensus among the analysts
as to the importance of this variable in projecting REIT growth, this
variable may indeed prove to be a significant determinant of franchise
value.
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Visibility
TRADEVOL. Trade Volume - The positive coefficient for this variable
indicates that, not unlike Total Market Capitalization, this measure of a
REIT's visibility is moderately significant in explaining franchise value.
Conflicts of Interest
PERINSID. Percentage Insiders (No. of executives in Board) - The
positive coefficient for this variable is not as expected. The high
percentage of executives on the Board of Directors was hypothesized
to present a conflict of interest and the mild significance of this
variable to franchise value indicates that the opposite may be true-
the presence of management on the REIT's Board is not seen as
impacting the REIT's stock performance negatively, and may even
contribute to its franchise value.
4.3 Variables not included in the Final Analysis
Several variables were removed due to multi-collinearity problems that they
caused in the regression model. The majority of these variables were
essentially redundant measures of the same component of franchise value.
These are as follows:
SLFMGMT. In-house Property Management - This variable caused
multiple collinearity issues on all regression runs. Virtually all
companies had this capacity in both'97 and '99, rendering this
measurement unreliable.
NEWENG. New England - This variable caused collinearity issues with
other regional sectors and had to be discarded.
OWNIMP. Percentage Inside Ownership - This variable caused
collinearity problems in model, and in fact is a redundant measure of
Executive Ownership (BENTOP6), which proved to be somewhat
significant in the model. (See Exhibit 4)
Determinants of REIT Franchise Value-A Reprise 40
OWNINSTN. Number of Institutional Owners - This variable caused
collinearity problems, most likely with Percentage Institutional
Ownership (INSTOWN), which is a better measure of Visibility.
EBITINT. (EBITDA/Interest) - This coverage variable caused
collinearity problems in the model throughout all regression runs for
this thesis as well as those for the previous thesis.
TRADENO. Number of Weekly Shares Traded - This variable caused
collinearity problems, most likely with Percentage Weekly Average
Shares Traded (TRADEVOL), which is a better measure of Visibility.
DEB7TAV. Debt to Total Asset Value - This variable caused collinearity
problems, most likely with Debt/Total Market Cap (PERDEBT), which is
an arguably more objective measure of a company's leverage.
NOANAL. Number of Analysts - This variable caused collinearity
problems, most likely with any of the other measures of Visibility.
OPUNITS. Outstanding Partnership Units as a percentage of Total
Market Cap - This variable caused multicollinearity problems, most
likely with Structure (UPREIT or Traditional) variable.
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5.0 Conclusions
This paper revisits the statistical model used two years ago that examined the
determinants of premiums to net asset value (NAV) as a measure of REIT franchise
value. This paper also explores how these determinants explain another, perhaps
more relevant measure of franchise value-the Price-to-FFO multiple. To the extent
that a REIT is a going concern that can buy, sell and invest in real estate products
in the marketplace, and not a closed-end fund, the Price-to-FFO multiple, which is a
measure of the company's earning power, rather than the portfolio's liquidation
value, could be deemed as an equally valid measure of franchise value.
The franchise value components are identified and grouped into three general
criteria: Internal and External Structural Components, Human Resource
Components, and Governance Issues, based on literature and informational
interviews conducted in the previous thesis30. This thesis utilizes this model, which
places equal emphasis on objective as well as subjective components of REIT
franchise valuation.
These components as independent variables are then separately regressed against
the dependent variables of NAV premium and Price-to-FFO multiple, in an effort to
quantify their impact on these measures of franchise value.
5.1 Findings / Conclusions
The results of the study were unexpected. The model, which successfully
identified with a 72.9% confidence level the significant variables which
determined the premiums to NAV at which the REITs traded in 1998, did not
produce the same results across a two year time-span.
When the same econometric model was applied using alternate specifications
for the dependent variable, the relationship between the Price-to-FFO
multiple and the independent variables was more conclusive than that for the
NAV premium, with a 7 6.6% confidence level, as measured by Adjusted R-
squared value. The regression results are summarized in Exhibit 4 and the
output from the statistical program are attached in Appendices 7a and 7b.
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The analyses revealed that several components have statistically significant
impact on a REIT's franchise value, as measured by its FFO multiple. These
include objective and subjective values, such as: a REIT's focus; its specific
geographic concentration in the MidAtlantic, Southwest and the Farm Belt
regions; the company's balance sheet strength as reflected by low debt
levels; its visibility as measured by its total market capitalization and trade
volume; seasoned management as measured by positive average earnings
surprise and average tenure of executives in the company; low levels of
entrepreneurship in the company's top management; low levels of
disclosure; and conflict of interest mitigations. An overview of the significant
variables tested against the Price-to-FFO multiple, as well as the previous
thesis' statistical overview for the sample of Apartment and Office REITs are
shown in Exhibit 5.
Exhibit 5
Overview of Statistical Results for Comparison
Significant Variables, '97 Data Significant Variables, '97-'99 Data
(significant at a 95% confidence (significant at a 95% confidence
level) level)level)
* Portfolio presence in certain
geographical areas
* 1998 Capital Deployment
capacity
· Percentage variable rate debt
* G&A as a percentage of NOI
(low)
· Total Inside Ownership
· Executive Inside Ownership
* Focus (low-office)
* Portfolio presence in certain
geographical areas
* Percentage Total Debt
* Total Capitalization
* G&A as a percentage of NOI
(high)
* Executive Tenure
* Average Earnings Surprise
* Entrepreneurial Tendencies
(Vision)
* Disclosure (low)
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Marginally Significant Variables, '97 Marginally Sign. Variables, '97-'99
Data Data
(significant at not less than 70 % (significant at not less than 70 %
confidence level) confidence level)
· Geographical Diversification · Executive Inside Ownership
* Development Capabilities · Trade Volume
* Total Market Capitalization · Deployment Capacity
* Debt Rating
* Number of Institutional Owners
* Analyst Coverage
* Structure (UPREIT/Traditional)
Several variables which were expected to render a strong impact on
franchise value, particularly during the down-cycle, did not produce
conclusive results. The ability to generate external growth, as measured by
variables such as Development Capacity, Projected Capital Deployment levels
and Debt Capacity/Projected Capital Deployment (which measures the ability
to grow without issuing more equity), did not appear to have great
significance, or at best, rendered a mild impact on franchise value.
These results reflect a broad range of estimates in projected capital
deployment numbers for each company, as well as lack of consensus among
analysts on the importance of acquisition activity in a REIT's external growth.
In conversations with the various analysts however, one theme was
resonant-that at least in the short term, the REITs' internal growth, as
measured by earnings prospects, rather than their external growth, as
measured by their development and acquisitions strategy, is much easier to
calculate and a far more reliable measure of the companies' growth prospects
in today's market. Thus most analysts are relying on the internally-
generated FFO of the companies, producing what may perhaps be more
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accurate estimates of company value. This could explain why, across
different economic cycles reflected in this pooled data, the FFO multiple was
a better measure of REIT franchise value.
5.2 Additional studies suggested by these conclusions
Because the econometric model proved more successful on different
specifications of dependent variables (NAV premium in 1998 and FFO
multiple in 2000) at different times, it would be useful to test this model
using various measures of franchise value, such as those mentioned earlier in
this study, including AFFO and Adjusted Net Income multiples, as the
calculations of these figures becomes more standardized and their reliability
improves. Periodic testing of this model may also indicate a pattern in which
certain measurements of the companies' objective and subjective qualities
would emerge as being more significant during different stages of the market
cycle. Further study could also be conducted on a larger sample, across
different sectors, or on time series for a control group of REITs, which may
provide valuable verification of this model and these results.
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Appendix 1
Dependent Variable - 1999 Premium to Net Asset Value Calculation
Name
Associated Estates Realty Corporat
Apartment Investment and Manage
Amli Residential Properties Trust
Arden Realty Inc.
Archstone Communities Trust
Avalon Bay Properties Inc.
Brandywine Realty Trust
Bedford Property Investors, Inc.
BRE Properties, Inc.
Boston Properties, Inc.
Mack-Cali Realty Corporation
Cornerstone Properties, Inc.
Camden Property Trust
CarrAmerica Realty Corporation
Duke Realty Investments, Inc.
Equity Office Properties Trust
Equity Residential Properties Trust
Essex Property Trust, Inc.
Gables Residential Trust
Great Lakes REIT, Inc.
Highwoods Properties, Inc.
Home Properties of New York, Inc
Koger Equity, Inc.
Kilroy Realty Corporation
Mid-America Apartment Communi
Parkway Properties, Inc.
Prentiss Properties Trust Inc.
Post Properties, Inc.
Reckson Associates Realty Corpor
SL Green Realty Corp.
Summit Properties, Inc.
Spieker Properties, Inc.
Charles E. Smith Residential Realt
Cornerstone Realty Income Trust I
Town and Country Trust
United Dominion Realty Trust, Inc
icke
AEC
AIV
AMI
ARI
ASN
AVE
BDN
BED
BRE
BXP
CLI
CPP
CPT
CRE
DRE
EOP
EQR
ESS
GBP
GL
HIW
HME
KE
KRC
MA
PKY
PP
PPS
RA
SLG
SMT
SPK
SRA
TCR
TCT
UDR
12/31/99
Shares
21,172,340
66,763,000
16,655,155
63,350,000
139,400,000
65,738,000
37,154,000
17,530,000
44,679,000
67,903,000
58,395,000
129,611,000
40,213,000
66,823,000
125,212,000
252,170,000
126,415,000
18,055,000
25,444,000
17,266,000
62,053,000
19,299,000
26,758,000
27,894,000
18,424,000
10,101,000
37,608,000
38,776,000
40,370,000
24,204,000
28,712,000
64,917,000
19,790,000
39,662,000
15,788,000
102,997,000
Net Asset Value Per Share, As Calculated By:
SSB Green Merrill Lehman Legg Bear
Street Lynch Bros. Mason Srearns
$7.67 $12.00
$42.64 $39.50
$25.75
$27.17
$24.44
S40.68
$20.97
$24.00
$26.09
$35.03
$34.24
$17.50
$33.71
$30.54
$21.40
$30.37
S46.91
S42.70
$26.34
$20.04
$27.83
$30.09
$26.19
$28.35
S29.14
$32.18
$29.72
$45.97
$28.93
$30.02
$26.07
S41.42
S41.25
$12.97
$17.31
$12.75
$25.75
$23.00
S42.25
$38.25 $41.40
$24.00
$28.40
$24.20 $26.10
$40.05 $42.10
$22.72 $23.10
$22.50
$29.25 $28.15
$34.75 $36.79
$33.25 $36.59
$19.00 $17.88
$32.75 $34.94
$27.75 $32.96
$21.75 $23.89
$29.50 $29.87
$47.50 $47.61
$37.95
$29.25 $30.89
$40.80
$35.60
$10.00 $12.34
$43.79
$26.64
$25.00 $23.11
$40.79 $42.58
$28.50 $27.09
$37.57
$36.46
$30.10 $34.50
$31.50 $31.74
$22.90 $23.27
$49.60
$40.40
$46.80
$21.90
$28.00 $30.54 $29.40
$26.00 $27.52 $28.40
$28.91 $27.80
$34.50
$26.75 $30.70
$41.75 $42.90 $48.80
$23.50 $26.35 $24.50
$30.20
$24.25 $23.83 $22.90
$42.50 $42.41 $47.70
$39.25 $41.00
$17.75
$13.00
$16.00
$13.41 $13.40
$35.75
$30.50
$28.47 $30.61
$49.34
$39.81
$30.91 $29.72
$30.95
$30.10
$23.45
$29.10
$41.67
$26.63
$26.70
$45.60
$27.28
$23.04
$40.00 $41.49
$15.86
$12.00 $14.15
Data
Count
Cac'd
NAVper Share
Mean Sd Dev
Caoc'd Cle'd
$10.50
S41.12
$25.46
$27.11
$24.31
S41.41
$22.26
$23.25
$27.82
$36.99
$35.23
$18.13
$33.63
$30.83
$22.64
$29.76
S48.19
$40.22
$32.32
$20.97
$29.34
$30.10
$24.82
$27.57
$28.74
$33.34
$29.06
S44.45
$26.20
$28.97
$24.02
S43.51
S40.60
$12.97
$16.73
$13.12
$2.15
$2.26
$1.34
$1.33
$1.17
$1.03
$1.14
$1.06
$1.24
$2.44
$1.45
$0.78
$2.01
$1.76
$1.04
$0.84
$1.20
$1.96
$7.29
$1.32
$1.42
$0.01
$1.94
$1.12
$0.63
$1.64
$2.06
$2.83
$1.95
$1.97
$1.28
$2.84
$0.94
$0.00
$0.94
$0.73
12/31/99 Net Asset Equity Mkt
hare Pric Value Capitalization
price NAV
$7.81
$39.81
$21.19
$20.06
$20.50
$34.31
$16.38
$17.10
$22.69
$31.13
$26.06
$14.63
$27.38
$21.13
$19.50
$24.63
$42.69
$34.00
$24.00
$14.38
$23.25
$27.44
$16.88
$22.38
$22.63
$28.81
$21.38
$38.25
$20.50
$21.75
$17.88
$36.44
$35.38
$9.75
$17.94
$9.88
222,362,501
2,745,027,508
424,095,763
1,717,207,333
3,388,581,667
2,722,101,017
827,171,887
407,572,500
1,242,791,064
2,511,596,164
2,057,139,060
2,349,415,393
1,352,162,125
2,060,264,462
2,835,050,104
7,505,587,880
6,092,191,680
726,081,825
822,307,673
362,068,020
1,820,883,232
580,803,405
664,133,560
768,967,845
529,459,700
336,767,340
1,092,763,120
1,723,528,573
1,057,626,717
701,270,560
689,604,816
2,824,376,378
803,434,420
514,416,140
264,133,240
1.351.148.978
165,355,975
2,657,835,03C
352,922,734
1,270,801,00C
2,857,700,00
2,255,470,78C
608,582,52C
299,763,00C
1,013,766,51C
2,113,820,39C
1,521,773,70C
1,896,208,93C
1,101,031,940
1,411,969,99
2,441,634,000
6,210,947,100
5,396,656,350
613,870,00
610,656,00O
248,285,080
1,442,732,250
529,564,560
451,675,040
624,267,720
416,935,120
291,009,810
804,059,040
1,483,182,00
827,585,00O
526,437,00O
513,370,560
2,365,575,480
700,170,20C
386,704,500
283,236,720
1.017.610.360
Count: No. of REITs in stu 36 35 26 23 29 15 23 Average 80.52%
Standard De 8.03%
Minimum 68.01%
Maximum 107.23%
NAV
Premium
navprem
74.36%
96.82%
83.22%r/
74.00%
84.33%
82.86%
73.57%
73.55%
81.57%
84.16%
73.98%
80.71%
81.43%
68.53%
86.12%
82.75%
88.58%
84.55%
74.26%
68.57%
79.23%
91.18%
68.01%
81.18%
78.75%
86.41%
73.58%
86.05%
78.25%
75.07%/
74.44%
83.76%
87.15%
75.17%
107.23%
75.31%
I . . . . . .
._
Appendix 2
Dependent Variable:
1999 Price to FFO Multiple Calculation (Consensus)
Name
Associated Estates Realty Corporatio
Apartment Investment and Manageme
Amli Residential Properties Trust
Arden Realty Inc.
Archstone Communities Trust
Avalon Bay Properties Inc.
Brandywine Realty Trust
Bedford Property Investors, Inc.
BRE Properties, Inc.
Boston Properties, Inc.
Mack-Cali Realty Corporation
Cornerstone Properties, Inc.
Camden Property Trust
CarrAmerica Realty Corporation
Duke Realty Investments, Inc.
Equity Office Properties Trust
Equity Residential Properties Trust
Essex Property Trust, Inc.
Gables Residential Trust
Great Lakes REIT, Inc.
Highwoods Properties, Inc.
Home Properties of New York, Inc.
Koger Equity, Inc.
Kilroy Realty Corporation
Mid-America Apartment Communitie
Parkway Properties, Inc.
Prentiss Properties Trust Inc.
Post Properties, Inc.
Reckson Associates Realty Corporati
SL Green Realty Corp.
Summit Properties, Inc.
Spieker Properties, Inc.
Charles E. Smith Residential Realty,
Cornerstone Realty Income Trust Inc.
Town and Country Trust
United Dominion Realty Trust. Inc.
icker
AEC Apt
AIV Apt
AML Apt
ARI Office
ASN Apt
AVB Apt
BDN Office
BED Office
BRE Apt
BXP Office
CLI Office
CPP Office
CPT Apt
CRE Office
DRE Office
EOP Office
EQR Apt
ESS Apt
GBP Apt
GL Office
HIW Office
HME Apt
KE Office
KRC Office
MA Apt
PKY Office
PP Office
PPS Apt
RA Office
SLG Office
SMT Apt
SPK Office
SRW Apt
TCR Apt
TCT Apt
UDR Apt
1999 AFFO Per Share, As Calculated By:
SSB Green Merrill Goldma Legg Bear
Street Lynch Sachs Mason Steams
$1.22 $1.45 $1.45
$3.55 $4.08 $3.59 $4.08
$2.59 $2.59
$2.60 $2.60 $2.60
$1.87 $1.97 $1.88 $1.97
$3.12 $3.22 $3.10 $3.22
$1.96 $2.44
$2.32 $2.14 $2.32
$2.39 $2.89 $2.49 $2.89
$2.87 $3.31 $2.76 $3.31
$1.59 $1.42 $1.59
$2.77 $3.20 $2.89 $3.20
$2.07 $2.57 $2.36 $2.72
$1.89 $2.19 $1.99 $2.19
$2.05 $2.57 $2.17 $2.57
$3.85 $4.48 $3.96 $4.50
$3.01 $3.26
$2.52 $2.85 $2.46 $2.85
$0.00 $1.94
$2.56 $3.45 $2.89 $3.45
$2.48 $2.78
$2.50 $2.20
$2.09
$2.72
$2.50
$2.75
$3.64
$2.87
$3.47 $3.69 $3.46 $3.69
$1.97 $2.31 $2.01 $2.31
$1.59 $2.29
$2.20 $1.97 $2.20
$3.17 $3.46 $3.02 $3.46
$2.91 $3.23 $3.23
$1.08 $1.25
$1.96 $1.96
$1.07 $1.42 $1.22 $1.42
1.45
4.08
2.59
2.60
1.87
3.22
2.44
2.12
2.32
2.89
3.31
1.59
3.20
2.56
2.19
2.57
4.50
3.26
2.76
1.94
3.45
2.78
2.32
2.50
2.75
3.64
2.87
3.69
2.31
2.29
2.20
3.46
3.23
1.25
1.96
1.27
$1.45
$4.08
$2.59
$2.60
$1.98
$3.22
$2.44
$2.32
$2.89
$3.31
$1.59
$3.20
$2.56
$2.19
$2.57
$4.50
$3.26
$2.85
$15.13
$3.46
$2.78
$2.32
$2.50
$2.75
$2.87
$3.69
$2.31
$2.29
$2.20
$3.46
$3.23
$1.96
$1.42
Count: 13
FFO
Data Multi
Count Mean Sd Dev
5 $1.40
6 $3.91
4 $2.59
5 $2.60
6 $1.92
6 $3.18
4 $2.32
1 $2.12
5 $2.28
6 $2.74
6 $3.15
5 $1.56
6 $3.08
6 $2.47
6 $2.11
6 $2.42
6 $4.30
4 $3.20
6 $2.72
4 $4.75
6 $3.21
4 $2.71
2 $2.32
5 $2.44
4 $2.59
3 $3.33
3 $2.87
6 $3.62
6 $2.20
4 $2.12
5 $2.15
6 $3.34
5 $3.17
3 $1.19
4 $1.96
6 $1.30
$0.10
$0.26
$0.00
$0.00
$0.06
$0.06
$0.24
$0.00
$0.08
$0.23
$0.26
$0.08
$0.19
$0.23
$0.13
$0.24
$0.31
$0.13
$0.18
$6.98
$0.39
$0.15
$0.00
$0.13
$0.33
$0.53
$0.00
$0.12
$0.17
$0.35
$0.10
$0.19
$0.14
$0.10
$0.00
$0.14
Count: No. of REITs in study: 36 23 26 24 33 36 33 Average
Standard Deviat
Minimum
Note: Morgan Stanley FFO figures not incld because they only cover 17 out of 36 REITs
12/31/99
Share Pric
$7.81
$39.81
$21.19
$20.06
$20.50
$34.31
$16.38
$17.10
$22.69
$31.13
$26.06
$14.63
$27.38
$21.13
$19.50
$24.63
$42.69
$34.00
$24.00
$14.38
$23.25
$27.44
$16.88
$22.38
$22.63
$28.81
$21.38
$38.25
$20.50
$21.75
$17.88
$36.44
$35.38
$9.75
$17.94
$9.88
Price to
FFO
Multiple
5.56
10.18
8.18
7.72
10.66
10.78
7.06
8.07
9.93
11.36
8.29
9.40
8.90
8.54
9.26
10.19
9.93
10.63
8.84
3.03
7.24
10.14
7.28
9.17
8.75
8.64
7.45
10.58
9.30
10.28
8.30
10.92
11.17
8.17
9.15
7.58
8.91
1.69
3.03
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Appendix 5a - '97-'99 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: NAV premium
Independent Variable: Orig. (Control) Variables)
NAV OUTPUT A -
Removed Variables:
(NAV Output 3 Run #4)
SLFMGMT, DEBTTAV, OWNINSTN, TRADENO, BENTOP6, INDEX_2, NOANAL)
ANOVA(z)
Sum of
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 20890.293 8 2611.287 18.867 .000(y)
25 Residual 9688.309 70 138.404
Total 30578.602 78
x Predictors in the Model: (Constant), DICLOSE, GANOI, VISION, FOCUS, PERDEBT, PERINSID, OW1NIMP, TOTALCAP
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 133.799 7.575 17.663 0
PERDEBT -1.271 0.13 -0.76 -9.78 0 0.75 1.334
TOTALCAP 2.79E-03 0.001 0.357 3.628 0.001 0.466 2.144
GANOI 1.103 0.426 0.184 2.587 0.012 0.899 1.112
25 VISION -2.54 1.383 -0.17 -1.836 0.071 0.525 1.903
DICLOSE -2.58 0.828 -0.221 -3.116 0.003 0.899 1.113
PERINSID 0.4 0.145 0.2 2.762 0.007 0.865 1.156
OWNIMP 0.561 0.194 0.221 2.888 0.005 0.772 1.295
FOCUS -9.958 2.839 -0.251 -3.508 0.001 0.886 1.129
Excluded Variables(y)
Collinearity Statistics
Beta In t Sig. MinimumModel Correlation Tolerance VIF MinimumTolerance
NOCAL .013(x) 0.187 0.853 0.022 0.885 1.13 0.459
OLDSOU -.038(x) -0.515 0.608 -0.062 0.851 1.175 0.466
depCAP 50 -.045(x) -0.624 0.535 -0.075 0.861 1.162 0.463
INDYCHR .020(x) 0.271 0.787 0.033 0.86 1.162 0.457
SOCAL .034(x) 0.489 0.626 0.059 0.927 1.079 0.464
MDCORP -.067(x) -0.944 0.348 -0.113 0.904 1.106 0.46
INSTOWN .004(x) 0.059 0.953 0.007 0.829 1.207 0.442
NEWENG .061(x) 0.796 0.429 0.095 0.769 1.301 0.404
INDMID -.019(x) -0.256 0.799 -0.031 0.828 1.207 0.463
DEVCAP -.031(x) -0.431 0.668 -0.052 0.912 1.096 0.457
STRUCT .013(x) 0.149 0.882 0.018 0.646 1.547 0.452
NEP -.017(x) -0.229 0.82 -0.028 0.819 1.221 0.466
25 MIDATL .001(x) 0.017 0.986 0.002 0.686 1.457 0.466
PAYRATIO -.090(x) -1.253 0.215 -0.149 0.871 1.149 0.438
GEOGRAP -.026(x) -0.327 0.745 -0.039 0.715 1.398 0.429
MINEXT -.012(x) -0.161 0.872 -0.019 0.835 1.197 0.461
AVGYRS .000(x) -0.002 0.998 0 0.819 1.222 0.466
INVGRAD .038(x) 0.405 0.687 0.049 0.512 1.952 0.328
OP units
outstanding .131(x) 1.775 0.08 0.209 0.812 1.231 0.465
VARDEBT -.088(x) -1.204 0.233 -0.143 0.84 1.191 0.427
FARM .051(x) 0.719 0.474 0.086 0.902 1.108 0.447
EBITINT -.103(x) -1.103 0.274 -0.132 0.518 1.932 0.417
SURPRISE .088(x) 1.149 0.255 0.137 0.771 1.297 0.463
TRADEVOL .117(x) 1.596 0.115 0.189 0.822 1.217 0.46
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of the Condition
Square Estimate Index
25 .827(y) 0.683 0.647 11.77% 17.468
Appendix 5b - '97-'99 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: NAV Premium
Independent Variable: Orig. (Control) + New Variables
NEW NAV OUTPUT A - (NEW NAV Output 1 Run #8)
Removed Variables: FOCUS, SLFMGMT, GEOGRAP, DEBTTAV, EBITINT, A&D, NEWSTOC, NOANAL, OWNINSTN, TOTALCAP,
OPUNITS, BENTOP6
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of Condition
Square a re the Estimate Index
23 .803(w) 0.645 0.609 12.37% 16.894
ANOVA(x)
Sum ofModel Suares df Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 19708.73 7 2815.533 18.391 .000(w)
23 Residual 10869.872 71 153.097
Total 30578.602 78
w Predictors: (Constant), PERDEBT, VARDEBT, PERINSID, DICLOSE, GANOI, INVGRAD, OWNIMP
x Dependent Variable: NAVPREM
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Collinearity StatisticsCoefficients Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 131.76 8.126 16.215 
PERDEBT -1.156 0.132 -0.691 -8.782 0 0.809 1.236
INVGRAD 7.757 3.235 0.196 2.398 0.019 0.751 1.332
VARDEBT -0.176 0.083 -0.157 -2.127 0.037 0.924 1.082
GANOI 0.979 0.453 0.163 2.162 0.034 0.882 1.133
DICLOSE -2.726 0.878 -0.234 -3.106 0.003 0.885 1.13
PERINSID 0.345 0.149 0.172 2.309 0.024 0.9 1.111
OWNIMP 0.559 0.212 0.221 2.634 0.01 0.713 1.402
Excluded Variables(w)
Partial Collinearity Statistics
Beta In t Sig. MinimumModel Correlation Tolerance VIFnimum
Tolerance
MIDATL -.015(v) 0.178 0.859 -0.021 0.704 1.421 0.61
INDYCHR -.006(v) -0.087 0.931 -0.01 0.906 1.103 0.677
DEVCAP -.033(v) -0.449 0.655 -0.054 0.941 1.062 0.713
INSTOWN -.019(v) -0.258 0.797 -0.031 0.929 1.076 0.701
PAYRATIO -.064(v) -0.841 0.403 -0.1 0.855 1.17 0.702
STRUCT -.009(v) -0.103 0.918 -0.012 0.704 1.421 0.614
No. Wkly .084(v) 1.094 0.278 0.13 0.855 1.169 0.705
NEP -.003(v) -0.042 0.967 -0.005 0.84 1.19 0.702
NOCAL .008(v) 0.104 0.917 0.012 0.908 1.101 0.708
INDMID .023(v) 0.292 0.771 0.035 0.85 1.176 0.709
OLDSOU -.062(v) -0.809 0.421 -0.096 0.851 1.175 0.683
23 AVGYRS -.016(v) -0.209 0.835 -0.025 0.817 1.224 0.658
VISION .031(v) 0.422 0.674 0.05 0.965 1.036 0.713
TRADEVOL .063(v) 0.825 0.412 0.098 0.872 1.147 0.664
MINEXT .038(v) 0.503 0.616 0.06 0.891 1.122 0.675
SURPRISE .054(v) 0.738 0.463 0.088 0.959 1.043 0.713
SOCAL .019(v) 0.264 0.793 0.032 0.932 1.073 0.713
depCAP 50 -.039(v) -0.506 0.614 -0.06 0.856 1.168 0.711
INDEX_2 .057(v) 0.755 0.453 0.09 0.876 1.141 0.693
FARM .075(v) 0.98 0.331 0.116 0.863 1.158 0.686
MDCORP -.073(v) -1.002 0.32 -0.119 0.948 1.054 0.713
NEWENG .115(v) 1.559 0.124 0.183 0.908 1.101 0.704
Appendix 6a- 1999 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Price to FFO Multiple
Independent Variable: Original (Control) + New Variables
99 FFO OUTPUT A - (Output 1 #9)
Removed Variables: SLFMGMT, INDEX_2, DEVCAP, FOCUS, GEOGRAP, MIDATL, DEBTTAV, OWNINSTN, PERDEBT, EBmNT,
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of the Condition
Square Estimate Index
22 .824(v) 0.679 0.602 0.6941 11.610
ANOVA(w)
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 29.562 7 4.223 8.767 .000(v)
22 Residual 13.97 29 0.482
Total 43.532 36
v Predictors: (Constant). UPVALUEP. NEWSTOC, FOCUS. NEWENG, BENTOP6. NOCAL, INSTOWN
w Dependent Variable: FFOMULT
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 6.7 0.446 15.013 0
NOCAL 1.92E-02 0.008 0.293 2.506 0.018 0.811 1.232
NEWSTOC 6.77E-02 0.027 0.291 2.506 0.018 0.821 1.218
INSTOWN 1.33E-02 0.007 0.245 1.851 0.074 0.632 1.582
UPVALUEP 4.14E-02 0.022 0.255 1.86 0.073 0.587 1.703
BENTOP6 4.70E-02 0.023 0.279 2.072 0.047 0.61 1.639
FOCUS -0.747 0.248 -0.34 -3.007 0.005 0.868 1.152
NEWENG 5.20E-02 0.025 0.246 2.082 0.046 0.792 1.262
Excluded Variables(v)
Collinearity Statistics
Beta In t Sig. MinimumModel Correlation Tolerance VIF Minimum
Tolerance
CHGVAC -.021(u) -0.177 0.861 -0.033 0.833 1.2 0.585
DISCLOSE -.053(u) -0.44 0.663 -0.083 0.792 1.263 0.559
SOCAL .009(u) 0.075 0.941 0.014 0.768 1.302 0.583
NEP -.019(u) -0.162 0.872 -0.031 0.806 1.241 0.534
TRADEVOL .040(u) 0.313 0.757 0.059 0.7 1.429 0.538
GANOI .048(u) 0.399 0.693 0.075 0.794 1.26 0.55
VISION .002(u) 0.015 0.988 0.003 0.907 1.102 0.587
SURPRISE .084(u) 0.711 0.483 0.133 0.803 1.246 0.587
CHGMGMT -.059(u) -0.502 0.619 -0.095 0.833 1.2 0.568
OLDSOU -.138(u) -1.134 0.266 -0.21 0.745 1.343 0.578
22 MINEXT -.088(u) -0.737 0.467 -0.138 0.791 1.265 0.582
GEOGRAP .053(u) 0.407 0.687 0.077 0.677 1.477 0.582
AVGYRS .035(u) 0.285 0.778 0.054 0.752 1.329 0.538
PAYRATIO .144(u) 1.111 0.276 0.206 0.652 1.533 0.436
VARDEBT .082(u) 0.506 0.617 0.095 0.43 2.326 0.43
PERINSID .022(u) 0.16 0.874 0.03 0.628 1.593 0.506
MDCORP -.015(u) -0.126 0.901 -0.024 0.841 1.188 0.582
INDYCHR -.127(u) -0.971 0.34 -0.181 0.648 1.543 0.552
STRUCT -.133(u) -1.013 0.32 -0.188 0.64 1.562 0.493
PERDEBT -.192(u) -1.602 0.12 -0.29 0.732 1.366 0.557
FARM -.178(u) -1.684 0.103 -0.303 0.927 1.078 0.582
·
Appendix 6b - 1999 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: NAV Premium
Independent Variable: Orig. (Control) + New Variables
99 NAV OUTPUT A - (Outputl #3)
Removed Variables: SLFMGMT, INDEX_2, DEVCAP, FOCUS, GEOGRAP, MIDATL, DEBTTAV, OWNINSTN, PERDEBT, EBITINT,
NOANAL, TOTALCAP, BENTOP6,0WNIMP,CHGVAC, GANOI
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of Condition
Model R Square Square the Estimate Index
25 .659(y) 0.434 0.363 6. 32 % 12.072
ANOVA(z)
Model Sum odf Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 978.955 4 244.739 6.134 .001(y)
25 Residual 1276.838 32 39.901
Total 2255.793 36
y Predictors: (Constant), BENTOP6, NEP, VARDEBT, PAYRATIO
z Dependent Variable: NAVPREM
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Coefficients StandardizCollinearity StatisticsCoefficients t Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 6.7 0.446 15.013 0
NOCAL 1.92E-02 0.008 0.293 2.506 0.018 0.811 1.232
NEWSTOC 6.77E-02 0.027 0.291 2.506 0.018 0.821 1.218
22 INSTOWN 1.33E-02 0.007 0.245 1.851 0.074 0.632 1.582
UPVALUEP 4.14E-02 0.022 0.255 1.86 0.073 0.587 1.703
BENTOP6 4.70E-02 0.023 0.279 2.072 0.047 0.61 1.639
FOCUS -0.747 0.248 -0.34 -3.007 0.005 0.868 1.152
NEWENG 5.20E-02 0.025 0.246 2.082 0.046 0.792 1.262
Excluded Variables (y)
Collinearity Statistics
Model Beta In Sig. Correlation Tolerance VIF MinimumTolerance
depCAP 50 -.015(x) -0.108 0.915 -0.019 0.91 1.099 0.702
PERINSID -.002(x) -0.011 0.991 -0.002 0.748 1.337 0.704
NEWENG -.005(x) -0.035 0.973 -0.006 0.922 1.085 0.691
VISION .184(x) 1.384 0.176 0.241 0.978 1.023 0.706
INDYCHR .098(x) 0.675 0.505 0.12 0.86 1.162 0.683
INDMID .051(x) 0.356 0.725 0.064 0.881 1.134 0.699
STRUCT -.002(x) -0.011 0.991 -0.002 0.687 1.455 0.652
AVGYRS -.142(x) -0.909 0.37 -0.161 0.731 1.367 0.659
DISCLOSE -.117(x) -0.824 0.416 -0.146 0.888 1.126 0.695
A&DLEV -.151(x) -1.042 0.305 -0.184 0.837 1.195 0.699
MINEXT -.058(x) -0.411 0.684 -0.074 0.898 1.114 0.708
INVGRAD -.067(x) -0.407 0.687 -0.073 0.667 1.5 0.597
INSTOWN -.044(x) -0.268 0.79 -0.048 0.669 1.495 0.608
TRADEVOL .022(x) 0.153 0.879 0.028 0.856 1.169 0.678
UPVALUEP .063(x) 0.361 0.72 0.065 0.589 1.699 0.589
PERDEBT .147(x) 0.992 0.329 0.175 0.812 1.232 0.688
SOCAL .047(x) 0.34 0.736 0.061 0.933 1.072 0.681
CHGMGMT .038(x) 0.275 0.785 0.049 0.93 1.075 0.691
MDCORP -.266(x) -1.934 0.062 -0.328 0.863 1.159 0.624
NEWSTOC .072(x) 0.419 0.678 0.075 0.61 1.638 0.553
SURPRISE .103(x) 0.746 0.461 0.133 0.939 1.065 0.671
FARM .120(x) 0.883 0.384 0.157 0.96 1.041 0.706
NOCAL -.072(x) -0.518 0.608 -0.093 0.938 1.066 0.69
OLDSOU -.224(x) -1.53 0.136 -0.265 0.794 1.26 0.673
_ _
Appendix 7a - '97-'99 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Price to FFO Multiple
Independent Variable: Original (Control) Variables
FFO OUTPUT B - (FFO Output 1 Run #19)
Removed Variables: SLFMGMT, NEWENG, OWNIMP, OWNINSTN, EBITINT, TRADENO, DEBTTAV, NOANAL,
OPUNITSoutstanding
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of Condition
Model R Square the Estimate Index
19 .895(s) 0.802 0.766 1.062 16.888
ANOVA(t)
Sum ofModel Squa df Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 300.866 12 25.072 22.227 .000(s)
19 Residual 74.45 66 1.128
Total 375.316 78
s Predictors: (Constant), BENTOP6, SURPRISE, SOCAL, DICLOSE, VISION, FARM, PERDEBT,
GANOI, FOCUS, AVGYRS, TOTALCAP, MIDATL
t Dependent Variable: FFOMULT
Coefficients(a)
StandardizedUnstandardized Coefficients Standardized Collinearity StatisticsCoefficients t Sig.
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 13.939 0.601 23.21 0
FOCUS -1.586 0.29 -0.36 -5.476 0 0.694 1.441
MIDATL 2.43E-02 0.005 0.349 5.145 0 0.654 1.529
FARM 0.117 0.057 0.126 2.044 0.045 0.797 1.255
SOCAL 1.63E-02 0.005 0.195 3.081 0.003 0.753 1.328
PERDEBT -0.146 0.012 -0.789 -12.106 0 0.707 1.414
19 TOTALCAP 4.91E-04 0 0.569 6.957 0 0.45 2.222
GANOI 0.137 0.039 0.206 3.555 0.001 0.892 1.121
AVGYRS 7.17E-02 0.023 0.197 3.135 0.003 0.764 1.308
SURPRISE 0.371 0.105 0.226 3.521 0.001 0.729 1.372
VISION -0.665 0.132 -0.403 -5.035 0 0.47 2.127
DICLOSE -0.214 0.077 -0.166 -2.791 0.007 0.852 1.174
BENTOP6 4.08E-02 0.021 0.129 1.951 0.055 0.692 1.445
Excluded Variables(s)
Collinearity Statistics
~~~~~~~~Model Beta In t Sig . Partial Tolerance VIFBeta In t Sig. MinimumModel Correlation Tolerance VIFnc
INDMID .029(r) 0.446 0.657 0.055 0.702 1.425 0.446
VARDEBT .012(r) 0.181 0.857 0.022 0.738 1.355 0.411
MDCORP -.051(r) -0.731 0.467 -0.09 0.624 1.601 0.449
INDYCHR -.018(r) -0.288 0.775 -0.036 0.784 1.276 0.443
INDEX_2 -.054(r) -0.643 0.522 -0.08 0.427 2.34 0.414
NOCAL -.009(r) -0.144 0.886 -0.018 0.737 1.357 0.433
MINEXT .007(r) 0.106 0.916 0.013 0.713 1.403 0.444
STRUCT .003(r) 0.043 0.966 0.005 0.645 1.55 0.438
19 PAYRATIO -.005(r) -0.08 0.936 -0.01 0.806 1.241 0.419
INSTOWN -.032(r) -0.483 0.631 -0.06 0.674 1.483 0.411
INVGRAD .072(r) 0.932 0.355 0.115 0.5 1.999 0.33
DEVCAP .011(r) 0.173 0.863 0.021 0.762 1.312 0.429
NEP .046(r) 0.588 0.559 0.073 0.497 2.011 0.449
depCAP 50 -.064(r) -1.068 0.29 -0.131 0.832 1.202 0.449
GEOGRAP .053(r) 0.827 0.411 0.102 0.739 1.354 0.398
OLDSOU -.027(r) -0.35 0.728 -0.043 0.506 1.975 0.444
PERINSID .065(r) 1.016 0.313 0.125 0.74 1.352 0.447
TRADEVOL .097(r) 1.453 0.151 0.177 0.658 1.52 0.445
Appendix 7b - '97-'99 Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Price to FFO Multiple
Independent Variable: Orig. (Control) + New Variables
NEW FFO OUTPUT B - (NEW FFO Output 3, Run #6)
Removed Variables: SLFMGMT, NEWENG, DEBTTAV, EBITINT, OWNINSTN, NOANAL, TRADENO, OPUNITS, OWNIMP,
INDEX_2, OLDSOU, NEP, DEPCAP50, INVGRAD
ANOVA(q)
Sum of
Model Sum of df Mean Square F Sig.Squares
Regression 300.866 12 25.072 22.227 .000(p)
16 Residual 74.45 66 1.128
Total 375.316 78
p Predictors: (Constant), SOCAL, SURPRISE, FARM, GANOI, DICLOSE, VISION, FOCUS,
AVGYRS, BENTOP6, PERDEBT, MIDATL, TOTALCAP
q Dependent Variable: FFOMULT
Coefficients(a)
Unstandardized Standardized
Coefficients Coefficients t Sig.stics
Model B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 13.939 0.601 23.21 0
PERDEBT -0.146 0.012 -0.789 -12.106 0 0.707 1.414
TOTALCAP 4.91E-04 0 0.569 6.957 0 0.45 2.222
GANOI 0.137 0.039 0.206 3.555 0.001 0.892 1.121
AVGYRS 7.17E-02 0.023 0.197 3.135 0.003 0.764 1.308
SURPRISE 0.371 0.105 0.226 3.521 0.001 0.729 1.372
16 VISION -0.665 0.132 -0.403 -5.035 0 0.47 2.127
DICLOSE -0.214 0.077 -0.166 -2.791 0.007 0.852 1.174
BENTOP6 4.08E-02 0.021 0.129 1.951 0.055 0.692 1.445
FOCUS -1.586 0.29 -0.36 -5.476 0 0.694 1.441
MIDATL 2.43E-02 0.005 0.349 5.145 0 0.654 1.529
FARM 0.117 0.057 0.126 2.044 0.045 0.797 1.255
SOCAL 1.63E-02 0.005 0.195 3.081 0.003 0.753 1.328
Excluded Variables(p)
Partial Collinearity Statistics
Model Beta In Sig. Correlation Tolerance VIF Minimum
Tolerance
STRUCT .003(o) 0.043 0.966 0.005 0.645 1.55 0.438
MINEXT .007(o) 0.106 0.916 0.013 0.713 1.403 0.444
VARDEBT .012(o) 0.181 0.857 0.022 0.738 1.355 0.411
INDYCHR -.018(o) -0.288 0.775 -0.036 0.784 1.276 0.443
PAYRATIO -.005(o) -0.08 0.936 -0.01 0.806 1.241 0.419
INSTOWN -.032(o) -0.483 0.631 -0.06 0.674 1.483 0.411
INDMID .029(o) 0.446 0.657 0.055 0.702 1.425 0.446
16 NOCAL -.009(o) -0.144 0.886 -0.018 0.737 1.357 0.433
GEOGRAP .053(o) 0.827 0.411 0.102 0.739 1.354 0.398
NEWSTOC -.046(o) -0.594 0.554 -0.074 0.503 1.989 0.317
MDCORP -.051(o) -0.731 0.467 -0.09 0.624 1.601 0.449
DEVCAP .011(o) 0.173 0.863 0.021 0.762 1.312 0.429
ADLEVL .078(o) 1.029 0.307 0.127 0.524 1.908 0.45
PERINSID .065(o) 1.016 0.313 0.125 0.74 1.352 0.447
TRADEVOL .097(o) 1.453 0.151 0.177 0.658 1.52 0.445
Model Summary
Adjusted R Std. Error of ConditionModel R R Square Square the Estimate Index
16 .895(p) 0.802 0.766 1.062 16.888
_· · · I ·
Appendix &
Hartzell, Shulman, Wurtzebach Economic Region Definition
Eight-Region Segmentation
-4. -
Description of Regions
We have divided the U.S. into eight cohesive economic activity regions that are mapped
in Exhibit 1. We define our regions as New England, Mid-Atlantic Corridor, Old South,
Industrial Midwest, Farm Belt, Mineral Extraction Area, Southern California and Northern
California. In doing this we have, in many cases, ignored state boundaries. For example,
we classify eastern Pennsylvania as part of the Mid-Atlantic Corridor and western Pennsylvania
as part of the Industrial Midwest. Similarly, California has been divided into northern and
southern portions with the southern portion including Arizona and southern Nevada. The
northern portion includes Oregon, Washington and northern Nevada.
New England This region includes all of the New England states with the exception of Fairfield
County, Connecticut, which is part of the Mid-Atlantic Corridor. The employment base here
has shifted dramatically from old-line manufacturing to high-technology production and
business, financial and education services. The high education level of the region and the
willingness of its huge college student population to settle after graduation has created the
basis for a post-industrial economy. The infrastructure is old and the combination of an
already built-up environment and strong land use regulation make additions to supply difficult.
Harsh winter weather makes this region a net energy importer. Defense spending, especially
in Connecticut and Massachusetts, is an important contributor to New England's economic
well-being.
Mid-Atlantic Corridor This region stretches along the Atlantic Coast from Fairfield County,
Connecticut to Northern Virginia. The region is dominated by financial and business services
in the greater New York City area and government/defense in the Washington, D.C. area.
The region has benefited from the import boom by serving as the East Coast port of entry
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for imported goods and from the explosion of debt caused by the budget and trade deficits
and the deregulation of financial services. The region has the densest population in the U.S.
and it is a net energy importer. The infrastructure is old and the cities historically have
centralized around an extensive system of public transportation. This has changed recently
as rapid development along the Washington, D.C. beltway and the highway corridors of
New Jersey took place.
Old South This region stretches from Virginia south to Florida and west to Arkansas and
grew rapidly in the 1970s as manufacturing companies relocated from the North. This
movement created the need for infrastructure that basically has been put in place within
the last two decades. The region is characterized by heavy federal investment in military
bases, highways and electric power. There is a higher percentage of low-income nonunion
workers here than in other parts of the country. As a result, the region has lower production
and living costs than the rest of the country. The region's economic growth has spurred
the development of an office economy that did not exist twenty-five years ago and would
not exist, were it not for the widespread use of air conditioning since the 1960s.
Industrial Midwest This is the industrial heartland of the United States. It encompasses the
Ohio and northern Mississippi valleys and is dominated by the unionized mass production
industries. Employment is based on steel, automobiles, machinery and farm equipment. The
region has been the hardest hit by cyclical declines and global competition. There is a dense
transportation system for the movement of goods from the major cities of Chicago and
Detroit. The area is a net energy importer and lost both population and employment from
the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. However, the decline has abated and several of the area's
major cities have been restructured into service economies. The region will benefit the most
from a lower exchange value of the dollar.
Farm Belt This region is dominated by the production and processing of agricultural
commodities and is typified by mostly rural areas with sparse population on the flat land
of the Great Plains. The agricultural depression of the 1980s led to an outmigration of
population. The major urban area within this region is Kansas City.
Mineral Extraftion Area Stretching from Louisiana to Montana and including Alaska, this area
rose and fell with the price of oil. In the 1970s the region achieved an unprecedented prosperity
only to see it evaporate in the mid-1980s. The boom left in its wake the largest amount
of overbuilding in the United States. However, the 1970s boom enabled many of the larger
cities in the region to achieve a critical mass in finance, business services and, to some extent,
high-technology production. The presence of these other industries along with a gradual
recovery in energy' will enable the region to gradually recover.
Southern California This region is the United States capital of the Pacific Basin and includes
Arizona, southern Nevada and Hawaii. It is the focus of trade and financial relations with
the Far East. As a result, it has benefited from the United States trade deficit. The region
has grown rapidly in the past by attracting people from all over the United States and the
rest of the world. It has the highest concentration of Mexican-Americans in the United States
and their presence has enabled many low-wage manufacturing and service industries to succeed.
The region also has the highest concentration of defense production in the United States.
Both land prices and incomes are high and in recent years there have been strong movements
to restrict growth by controlling land use.
Northern California In addition to northern California this area includes northern Nevada,
Oregori and Washington. The region is characterized by high education levels, a strong defense
industry and modern infrastructure. Although it has lost market share to southern California,
finance and business services remain strong industries here. In addition, there is a focus
on renewable resources in the form of lmber and hydroelectric power that gives the region
stronger environmental concerns than elsewhere. Foreign trade remains an important part
of the economy and this region too has been a major beneficiary of the import boom.
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Capital Deployment:
2000E Acquisitions Development Consensus
Name
Associated Estates Realty Corporation
Apartment Investment and Management Company
Amli Residential Properties Trust
Arden Realty Inc.
Archstone Communities Trust
Avalon Bay Properties Inc.
Brandywine Realty Trust
Bedford Property Investors, Inc.
BRE Properties, Inc.
Boston Properties, Inc.
Mack-Cali Realty Corporation
Cornerstone Properties, Inc.
Camden Property Trust
CarrAmerica Realty Corporation
Duke Realty Investments, Inc.
Equity Office Properties Trust
Equity Residential Properties Trust
Essex Property Trust, Inc.
Gables Residential Trust
Great Lakes REIT, Inc.
Highwoods Properties, Inc.
Home Properties of New York, Inc.
Koger Equity, Inc.
Kilroy Realty Corporation
Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc.
Parkway Properties, Inc.
Prentiss Properties Trust Inc.
Post Properties, Inc.
Reckson Associates Realty Corporation
SL Green Realty Corp.
Summit Properties, Inc.
Spieker Properties, Inc.
Charles E. Smith Residential Realty, Inc.
Cornerstone Realty Income Trust Inc.
Town and Country Trust
United Dominion Realty Trust. Inc.
I Acouisitions & Develooment. As Calculated By:
Ticker
AEC
AIV
AML
ARI
ASN
AVB
BDN
BED
BRE
BXP
CLI
CPP
CPT
CRE
DRE
EOP
EQR
ESS
GBP
GL
HIW
HME
KE
KRC
MAA
PKY
PP
PPS
RA
SLG
SMT
SPK
SRW
TCR
TCT
UDR
Apt
Apt
Apt
Office
Apt
Apt
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Office
Office
Apt
Apt
Apt
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Office
Apt
Office
Apt
Apt
Apt
Apt
Morgan Merrill Lehman Legg
Stanley Lynch Bros. Mason
($42.0)
$2.1
$412.5
$0.0
($18.8)
$18.6
($2.2)
$7.2
$80.0
$222.7
$135.0
$0.0
$208.4
$635.9
$411.2
$92.1
$24.3
$350.7
$154.2
$48.9
$413.3
$76.5
$120.0 $145.9
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